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Abstract
To examine the effect of foreign direct investment, this paper compares the post-acquisition
performance changes of foreign- and domestic-acquired firms in China. Unlike previous studies,
we investigate the purified effect of foreign ownership by using domestic-acquired firms as the
control group. After controlling for the acquisition effect that exists in domestic acquisitions, we
find no evidence that foreign ownership can bring additional productivity gains to target firms,
though both foreign and domestic acquisitions bring productivity improvements to target firms.
In contrast, a strong and robust finding is that foreign ownership significantly improves target
firms’ financial conditions and exports relative to domestic-acquired firms. Foreign acquisition
is also found to improve output, employment and wages for target firms. These findings con-
flict with the conventional view of productivity-driven FDI and highlight the financial channel
through which FDI benefits the host countries.
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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom follows that FDI can increase host countries’ productivity and such wisdom
is supported by numerous empirical studies documenting the superior performance of FDI-involved
firms in the host countries and the technology spillovers from these firms to their local counterparts.1
FDI is also considered safer than other types of capital inflows and became the favorite form of
foreign investment for emerging markets following the financial crises in the 1980s and 1990s.2 As a
result, many emerging markets provide tax and other incentives to attract FDI, and the past three
decades have observed dramatic FDI inflows to these countries.
However, policies designed to promote FDI can be counterproductive if policymakers do not
understand the mechanisms through which FDI benefits host countries. The positive correlation
between firm productivity and FDI may simply reflect endogenous FDI decisions: foreign investors
choose to acquire or start business with more productive domestic firms. For instance, Fons-Rosen
et al. (2013) find that FDI has a very small effect on target firms’ productivity in their sample
of advanced European economies after controlling for unobservable factors that influence ex-ante
acquisition decisions.
To control for the endogeneity issue, we employ the difference-in-differences method combined
with propensity score matching (e.g., Arnold and Javorcik, 2009). However, we depart from the
literature by examining purified performance gains from foreign ownership after controlling for gains
existing in domestic mergers and acquisitions. Some previous studies find that foreign acquisitions
can improve the performance of target firms even after taking into account selection bias.3 However,
numerous empirical studies document that domestic mergers and acquisitions are also followed
by substantial changes in the performance of target firms (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001).
In particular, Fons-Rosen et al. (2014) find that even negative changes in foreign ownership are
associated with firm productivity improvements, consistent with productivity improvements coming
1For instance, see Javorcik (2004) for Lithuania, Yasar and Morrison Paul (2007) for Turkey and Keller and Yeaple
(2009) for the US, among others. However, Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Haddad and Harrison (1993) find no or
even negative evidence for such technology spillovers in Morocco and Venezuela.
2For instance, Krugman (2001) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) document that FDI is counter-cyclical and also
less volatile than portfolio investment.
3For instance, see Arnold and Javorcik (2009) for plant-level evidence for Indonesia and Guadalupe, Kuzmina and
Thomas (2012) for a study on manufacturing firms in Spain.
from a general change in ownership rather than an increase in foreign ownership. Therefore, even
though previous studies evidently documented performance gains following foreign acquisitions, it
remains unclear whether foreign ownership is crucial for the detected gains.
Our main dataset is obtained from the firm-level data collected through China’s Annual Surveys
of Industrial Production from 2000 to 2007. Every firm in China has a registration type that
indicates its main ownership and we use such information to identify domestic and foreign mergers
and acquisitions. Each foreign-acquired firm is first paired with a domestic-acquired firm with
similar pre-acquisition characteristics by propensity-score matching. Then the post-acquisition
performance changes of these two groups of firms are compared using the difference-in-differences
method.
We find no evidence that foreign acquisitions can improve target firms’ productivity relative
to domestic acquisitions, which conflicts with the conventional view of productivity driven FDI.4
Foreign acquisitions in our data do not perform differently from domestic acquisitions in improv-
ing target firms’ productivity, and the result is robust under different measures of productivity.
Although both foreign and domestic acquisitions can improve target firms’ productivity relative
to domestic firms that experienced no change in their ownership, the productivity improvement
for the two types of acquisitions is comparable, leaving no additional gains from foreign ownership
relative to domestic acquisitions.
Next, we document robustly that foreign ownership significantly improved the financial con-
ditions (as measured by the leverage and liquidity ratios) of target firms relative to domestic
acquisitions, highlighting the financial benefits of FDI. Most previous studies mainly focus on the
productivity benefits of FDI to host countries. FDI firms’ advantages of easy credit access have been
largely neglected in empirical studies until recently. FDI firms are less financially constrained than
domestic firms due to their access to international financial markets and foreign parent companies
for credit, which is particularly true in emerging countries. For instance, Song, Storesletten and
Zilibotti (2011) and Dollar and Wei (2007) show that private firms in China are subject to strong
discrimination in obtaining credit from state-owned banks. Desai, Foley and Forbes (2008) docu-
4Chen (2011) also compares foreign- and domestic-acquired US firms, but her study focuses on the effect of FDI’s
source of origin on the performance of target firms.
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ment that US multinational affiliates in emerging markets are financially less constrained during
currency crises than local firms. These studies inspire us to examine whether foreign acquisitions
can improve financial conditions of target firms.
We find that following acquisitions, foreign-acquired firms rely less on external short-term debt
and more on internal capital than domestic-acquired firms, highlighting the advantages of foreign
ownership in relaxing credit constraints faced by target firms. The improvement of financial con-
ditions are both statistically significant and quantitatively meaningful. For instance, the liquidity
ratio of foreign-acquired firms increased over 4 percentage points two years following the acquisition
relative to domestic-acquired firms, which is a substantial increase relative to its pre-acquisition
mean of 11%. We also find that FDI from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan improves target firms’
financial conditions more strongly than FDI from other sources, indicating that the effect of FDI
varies with its sources of origin.
In addition, we evaluate firms’ other performance, which includes exports, capital per worker,
real wages, output, employment and real profits. Combined with our careful distinction between
gains from foreign ownership and domestic acquisition, our study offers a comprehensive, balanced
and accurate description of the advantages of FDI acquisitions relative to domestic acquisitions.
FDI is found to improve target firms’ exports, supporting the financial channel of FDI in
promoting international trade as documented in Manova, Wei and Zhang (forthcoming). Our results
show that such a channel remains at work even after we exclude the effect of domestic acquisition.
In addition, we check the robustness of these findings across different sources of origin for FDI and
the pre-acquisition export status of target firms, taking advantage of our panel data. Manova and
Zhang (2009) document that relative to domestic firms, FDI firms in China trade more and import
more products from more source countries but export fewer products to fewer destinations. While
their study documents the difference in exporting behaviors between domestic and FDI firms, we
identify the causal effect of FDI on target firms’ exports following the acquisition.5
Foreign ownership is also found to increase output, employment and wages of target firms rela-
5Besides FDI, monetary policy may also influence international trade through financial channels. For instance,
Ju, Lin and Wei (2014) recently document that changes in monetary policy can affect exports through their effect on
financial constraints of trade sectors, on top of the effect through the real exchange rate and aggregate demand.
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tive to domestic-acquired firms. This may be because that the improvements of financial conditions
can help firms increase sales and market shares relative to their rivals, as suggested in previous em-
pirical studies. All in all, our empirical results suggest the following channels through which foreign
ownership benefits the host countries: foreign ownership can strongly ease target firms’ financial
constraints and promote their participation in export activities, resulting in increases in output,
employment and labor incomes. However, we do not find strong evidence that foreign ownership
increases firm productivity relative to domestic acquisitions.
Although we use Chinese data, our findings are likely to hold in other emerging markets too.
Abundant empirical evidence shows that local firms in emerging markets are more financially con-
strained than FDI firms (e.g., Harrison and McMillan, 2003). Financial markets in developing
countries usually have many frictions due to the status of development and/or market distortions
imposed by the government. Therefore, FDI’s financial benefits documented in our Chinese da-
ta are very likely to exist in other emerging markets. Recently, Alquist et al. (2014) document
evidence of liquidity-driven FDI in the manufacturing sector of fifteen emerging economies.
Our paper contributes to the literature that explores other motivations for FDI and their effects
on host countries. Nocke and Yeaple (2007) show that cross-border mergers and acquisitions can be
driven by the complementarities between internationally mobile and non-mobile capacities rather
than productivity differentials. Blonigen et al. (forthcoming) argue that FDI can be driven by the
existing export networks of local firms and they find empirical evidence in French manufacturing
firms. This paper emphasizes the role of financial factors in foreign acquisitions. Our empirical
findings conflict with the conventional view of productivity-driven FDI and highlight the financial
channel through which FDI benefits the host countries.
Although some previous empirical studies question the productivity benefits of FDI to advanced
economies, it may remain reasonable to believe the productivity gains for FDI to emerging markets
because these countries lag far behind advanced economies in technology. However, we document
that even foreign acquisitions in China, an emerging market, do not improve target firms’ produc-
tivity relative to domestic acquisitions. Our results question the policies that intend to catch up
to the technological frontier by providing tax and financial benefits to FDI.
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Our paper also contributes to the recent literature that examines the effect of firms’ financial
constraints on trade and FDI. Manova, Wei and Zhang (forthcoming) document that FDI can
promote exports and economic growth by mitigating firms’ financial constraints. They find that
FDI firms in China have better export performance than domestic firms, and this finding is more
pronounced in more financially vulnerable sectors. In a related study, Huang et al. (2008) show,
using firm-level data in the garment industry of China, that firms with greater financial constraints
are more likely to be acquired by foreigners. Our paper complements these studies by identifying
causal effects of FDI on target firms’ performance through ownership changes. While Manova,
Wei and Zhang (forthcoming) rely on cross-sectional variations for their identification, we employ
panel data to study changes in firms’ performance following acquisitions. In particular, our panel
data allow us to control for the effect of domestic ownership changes by using domestic-acquired
firms as our control group. Due to data restrictions, Manova, Wei and Zhang’s (forthcoming)
study focuses on trade and does not examine the effect of FDI on firm productivity either. While
Huang et al.’s (2008) results support that target firms’ financial constraints are an important pre-
acquisition factor for endogenous FDI decision, our findings focus on the causal effect of FDI on
target firms’ post-acquisition financial conditions and other performances. Our study also covers
broader industries than Huang et al. (2008).
We conclude this section by discussing some limits of our empirical findings and directions
for future studies. First, our paper focuses on the direct effects of foreign acquisitions and does
not consider several other channels for FDI to increase host countries’ productivity. We exclude
greenfield FDI in the study due to our econometric method. Greenfield FDI may be more likely
than foreign mergers and acquisitions to improve host countries’ productivity. One important
reason for greenfield FDI is that local firms are not suitable for acquisitions due to their obsolete
technology and/or management styles. In this case, greenfield FDI firms are very likely to boost
the host country’s productivity by introducing new technology and management skills (e.g., Nocke
and Yeaple, 2008). Brandt et al. (2012) document a significant increase in firm-level TFP in China
during the period of 1998-2007 and new entries account for over two-thirds of the increase in TFP.
Due to data limitations, our paper is also silent about technology spillovers from FDI to domestic
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firms. In particular, several recent studies (e.g, Goldberg et al., 2009, 2010 and de Loecker et al.,
2012) document important effects of access to foreign inputs on local firms’ product innovation. It
is likely that FDI can benefit the target firms and their downstream firms through this channel.
Second, our results might also depend on the technology gap between the host and source
countries of FDI.6 The technology gap between Chinese firms and their foreign counterparts has
shrank dramatically since China adopted radical economic reforms in the early 1980s. The pro-
ductivity gains from foreign ownership might have become insignificant in our sample period that
starts in 2000. However, this does not exclude the possibility that foreign ownership improved Chi-
na’s productivity in the 1990s when Chinese firms lagged further behind their peers in advanced
economies.7
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes our econometric strategy.
Section 3 introduces the data, the way we identify acquisitions from firms’ registration informa-
tion and the matching of foreign and domestic acquisitions. Section 4 presents and discusses our
empirical results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Econometric Strategy
Our primary goal is to study whether FDI can improve acquired firms’ performance. A simple
least-squares estimation in this case is inadequate due to the endogeneity of acquisition decisions.
The endogeneity issue can be mitigated by employing the difference-in-differences method, which
compares the firms acquired by foreigners (treatment group) to the firms that are not acquired by
foreigners (control group). If the average performance improvement of the treatment group differs
systematically from that of the control group following the acquisition, it provides evidence that
the foreign acquisition may have caused such performance improvement.
However, there are two potential pitfalls for this method. First, the choice of control group is
a crucial issue. One may want to use all firms that are not acquired by foreigners as the control
6For instance, Chen (2011) and Kamal (2014) document that the source of origin of FDI influences the performance
of target firms.
7Productivity improvements could also be limited if the technology gap is too big because firms may have to be
at a similar level to benefit from technology transfer. See Cohen and Levinthal (1989) for discussions on absorptive
capacity.
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group. In this case, the underlying question is whether a firm performs better after being acquired
by foreign firms relative to a firm that is not acquired by foreigners. However, there are two types of
domestic firms in the control group. Some domestic firms experienced no change in their ownership
and others were acquired by their domestic peers. In the case of no change in ownership, even
if foreign-acquired firms on average outperform the firms in the control group, it is still not clear
whether the performance improvement is caused by the foreign ownership or due to an acquisition
in general. The target firms would probably have experienced similar performance improvement
had they been acquired by domestic firms. Indeed, there is a large literature documenting the pro-
ductivity and other gains of target firms from acquisitions. Therefore, we argue that an appropriate
control group should only include the firms that are acquired by domestic firms.8
Second, the difference-in-differences method is still vulnerable to any time-varying bias induced
by the foreign firms’ non-random selection of target firms. This issue is addressed in the literature
by combining the difference-in-differences method with some matching technique that creates a
comparison group with similar pre-acquisition characteristics as the treatment group. In this way,
the comparison is restricted to the differences within carefully selected pairs of firms/plants that
have similar observable pre-acquisition characteristics. For instance, Arnold and Javorcik (2009)
and Chen (2011) estimated the probability of firms/plants being acquired by foreigners using a
probit model, and the predicted probability (propensity score) forms the basis of matching the
treatment and control firms/plants. In this paper, we combine the difference-in-differences method
with the propensity score matching method in Abadie and Imbens (2009). Compared to previ-
ous studies, Abadie and Imbens (2009) take into account the fact that the propensity scores are
random variables and are estimated from the data (instead of being constants), and they derive
the adjustment to the large sample variance of the estimated treatment effects. Our propensity
score matching includes similar control variables as in Arnold and Javorcik (2009). Details on the
propensity score matching are reported in Section 3.2.
8Arnold and Javorcik (2009) examine, as a robustness check, the effects of foreign acquisitions versus domestic
acquisitions using privatization cases in their data. However, they only have 80 or less observations in their data
and could not control for factors such as the industrial and acquisition year effects due to data limitations. Our data
contain information that allows us to investigate this issue more thoroughly.
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3 Data
Our main dataset contains firm-level data collected by the National Bureau of Statistics of Chi-
na through the Annual Surveys of Industrial Production. The raw dataset covers all state-owned
manufacturing firms and private manufacturing firms with sales greater than 5 million RMB (ap-
proximately 600,000 US dollars at the exchange rate of 2000) from 2000 to 2007 after cleaning. We
cleaned the data following standard procedures in the literature and the details of our data cleaning
procedure are included in the appendix. On average, there are over 125,000 firm-level observations
each year from 2000 to 2007. In the final dataset, we lose the observations of year 2000 because
the information of changes in registration type is required to identify acquisitions. In addition, we
have to end our sample in 2005 because we want to study the firms’ performance in the following
two years after the acquisition. Therefore, our consolidated dataset for empirical exercises covers
the period between 2001 and 2005.
The firm-level data include some basic firm information such as firm identification number,
registration type, start year, operating status and total employment. We use the changes in regis-
tration type to identify firm acquisitions, which we will describe shortly. Our dataset also contains
detailed information about each firm’s balance sheet and income statement. The balance sheet data
report detailed information about assets and liabilities such as total assets, fixed assets, current
assets, long-run investment, total liabilities, total equities and capital. Capital information includes
disaggregate-level information about the ownership of capital (e.g., state, collective, corporate, spe-
cial districts and foreign). So we can use such information as a cross-check on firms’ ownership. The
data on income statement include each firm’s total sales, total industry production, value added,
export volume, income from main product, cost from main product, financing cost, interest cost,
tax, wages, employee benefits, total intermediate inputs, total profits, etc. The above data are used
to calculate TFP of each firm following Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer’s (2006) method. Firm TFP
is re-scaled around the industry TFP mean and divided by the industry TFP standard deviation.9
Other variables used in our paper include the real wage, real capital per worker, export share,
9An appendix of describing the method of calculating firm TFP can be found on the authors’ websites. See De
Loecker and Warzynski (2012) for a recent example of using this method.
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leverage ratio and liquidity ratio. The real wage is calculated by deflating the nominal wage (total
nominal wage divided by the total number of employees) by the CPI, and this variable reflects the
real labor incomes. Real capital per worker is obtained by dividing nominal capital per worker by
industry-level PPI, which captures the capital intensity of firms. The export share is measured by
the ratio of exports to total sales.
Following the literature, the leverage ratio is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets, though our results are qualitatively robust to using other leverage ratio measures such as
short-term debt divided by current assets.10 A higher leverage ratio indicates that the firms depend
more on external financing to cover operational costs. These firms usually have more difficulties
raising funds in the future and therefore are more financially constrained. Following Greenaway,
Guariglia and Kneller (2007), the liquidity ratio is measured by:
Liquidity ratio =
Current assets - Current liabilities
Total assets
.
Current assets and liabilities are firms’ short-term assets and liabilities. A higher liquidity ratio
indicates that firms have more liquid assets to cope with potential external financial disruptions,
and therefore are less vulnerable to financial shocks and less financially constrained. The summary
statistics of the variables used in our paper are reported in the appendix (Table A.1).
3.1 Mapping Registration Changes to Acquisitions
Every firm in China has a registration type that indicates its main ownership. We classify these
registration types into four categories: state or collectively owned domestic firms (SCOEs), privately
owned domestic firms, mixed domestic firms and FDI firms. State-owned and collectively owned
firms are classified into one category because they usually contain government or semi-government
ownership. The first three categories include all domestic firms, while the last one contains foreign-
owned firms and joint ventures. The detailed mappings of individual firms’ registration codes into
10Our benchmark measure of the leverage ratio is employed in studies such as Ahn, Denis and Denis (2006). Our
results are robust to using other leverage ratio measures such as short-term debt divided by current assets used in
Greenaway et al. (2007) and following studies.
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these four categories are described in the appendix. If a firm’s registration type changed from
one category to another, its main ownership must have changed due to mergers and acquisitions.
Firms are classified as domestic acquired if their registration types changed within the first three
categories, while firms are classified as foreign acquired if their registration types changed from one
of the three domestic categories into the category of FDI firms. Then foreign-acquired domestic
firms are matched with their domestic-acquired counterparts and the performance of these two
groups of acquisitions are compared.11 We also employ several other classifications of domestic and
foreign acquisitions as robustness checks and will report their results later.
Table 1 shows the total number of firms in our cleaned dataset and the number of different types
of acquisitions from 2001 to 2007. In each year, around 500 domestic firms are acquired by foreigners
(Panel A). Among these foreign-acquired firms, about 20% were SCOEs before the acquisition. In
particular, state- or collectively-owned enterprises account for about half of foreign acquisitions
between 2001 and 2003, but the share fell sharply in 2004 and the following years to only 10%.
Note that most of these firms were collectively-owned rather than truly state-owned. Column five
reports the foreign acquisitions that involved state-owned enterprises (SOE), accounting for less
than 10% of all foreign acquisitions in most years.
Panel B shows that about 4,000 domestic firms were acquired by their domestic counterparts
in each year during our sample period. Among these domestic acquisitions, about 20% are initially
associated with SCOEs, but the share declined to around 10% after 2004. Like in foreign acqui-
sitions, most of these acquisitions are associated with collectively-owned enterprises rather than
SOEs. This pattern is consistent with China’s privatization reform of collectively-owned enterprise
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The privatization process is completed in 2003 and the share of
state- and collectively-owned enterprises declined sharply in both foreign and domestic mergers and
acquisitions. We will give more discussion on the privatization issue later. In particular, we show
in a robustness check that our main findings hold up well when we only include ex ante private
firms.
Here we need to acknowledge a potential issue for our identification of domestic and foreign
11Our results do not change qualitatively if we exclude the firms that change their registration types multiple times
during our sample period. Results are available upon request.
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acquisitions. In our benchmark case, we group several registration types into one category. For
instance, the category of privately owned domestic firms includes the following four registration
types: sole proprietorship, partnership, private limited liability corporations and private companies
limited by shares. The changes of registration types within a category may also be due to mergers
and acquisitions, but they will not be captured in our benchmark results. In other words, we only
consider a subset of all mergers and acquisitions in our data.
To address this issue, we consider several alternative cases to identify domestic and foreign
acquisitions. In one case, all registration type changes are considered as acquisitions. Note that
using all registration type changes overestimates the number of acquisitions in our data because
registration type changes may simply reflect changes in a firm’s legal status or business expansion,
instead of changes in ownership. For instance, many registration type changes within a category
are not accompanied by significant changes in the firms’ capital, indicating no major change in their
ownerships. In contrast, the identified acquisitions in our benchmark case are all associated with
major changes in firms’ capital structure, indicating changes in ownership. Additionally, we believe
that acquisitions of domestic firms by foreigners are substantial changes in the firms’ ownership
and such changes are more comparable to acquisitions across different categories rather than within
each category.
In the second case, all registration changes in the category of mixed domestic firms are considered
as acquisitions. This is because firms in this categories are more heterogeneous than those in other
categories. Therefore, registration type changes in this category are likely due to mergers and
acquisitions. Our results are also robust when we use changes in the foreign capital share to
identify foreign acquisitions and when we only include firms that are fully owned by foreigners after
the acquisitions. We will give more information about these exercises when reporting their results.
3.2 Matching Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions
To match domestic- and foreign-acquired firms, the following variables in the pre-acquisition year
are used as regressors in the logit model: firm TFP, employment, the real wage, firm age, the real
capital per worker, exporting status, a dummy for state-owned or collectively owned enterprises,
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the leverage ratio and the liquidity ratio. Blonigen et al. (forthcoming) find that foreign firms are
attracted to acquire domestic firms that had high productivity level but were hit by a negative
productivity shock. To address this issue, we also include the growth rate of productivity in the
pre-acquisition year as an independent variable in a robustness check.12 Among these variables,
productivity, employment, real wages and real capital per worker are in logs. Dummy variables for
the acquisition year and industry (2-digit level) are also added to control for their fixed effects.13
The exporting status is measured by a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is an exporter in
the year before acquisition. Most variables are employed by following Arnold and Javorcik (2009).
A dummy is added in our model for state or collectively owned firms because these firms are usually
subject to more restrictions on foreign acquisitions. We also include financial condition variables
(the leverage ratio and the liquidity ratio) in the estimation to control for the pre-acquisition
differences in financial conditions among the treatment and control groups. Since one of our major
findings is on the effects of foreign acquisitions on target firms’ financial conditions, it is crucial to
take into account the differences in financial conditions prior to acquisitions.
Table 2 reports the estimation results of the logit model. The coefficient estimates suggest that
a high level of productivity, employment, real wages and real capital per worker can significantly
increase a firm’s probability of being acquired by foreigners. However, the coefficient estimate
of productivity is only marginally significant at the 10% level, while the estimates of most other
coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 1% level. It suggests that target firms’
productivity may be a less important factor than other characteristics in foreign acquisitions.
Figure 1 shows the average TFP relative to the industrial mean for the foreign and domestic-
acquired firms, respectively, from two years prior to the acquisition through two years after the
acquisition. Since firm TFP is normalized around the industrial mean (at the 2-digit level), positive
TFP values in Figure 1 indicate that both domestic- and foreign-acquired firms are more productive
12Our results are also robust when we include pre-acquisition changes in the leverage and liquidity ratios or replace
the export status dummy with the size of exports relative to domestic sales in the logit model.
13An alternative method used in the literature for controlling for the acquisition year and industry fixed effects
is to first match the treatment and control groups in the same acquisition year and industry and then average the
treatment effects across acquisition years/industries. We do not follow this practice because Abadie and Imbens
(2008) prove that the bootstrapped standard errors in this method are inconsistent. We check the robustness of
our results to the exact match for acquisition year and industry by employing the nonparametric nearest neighbor
matching method in Abadie and Imbens (2008) and the results are reported in the appendix (Table A.19).
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than the average firm in the same industry before acquisitions. In addition, both types of firms
exhibit similar TFP decreases relative to the industrial average level prior to the acquisition, which
is consistent with the “cherry-picking” story in Blonigen et al. (forthcoming): investors are more
attracted to firms that had above-average productivity but were hit by negative productivity shocks.
Blonigen et al. (forthcoming) document a similar pattern in French manufacturing firms. Since our
treatment and control groups display similar decline in TFP prior to the acquisition, our results of
FDI’s effect on firm productivity are unlikely to be driven by the difference in the “cherry-pricking”
behaviors of home and foreign investors.
Being an exporter before the acquisition also significantly increases a firm’s chance of being
acquired by foreigners. This might be due to two reasons. First, exporters are usually more
productive. Second, FDI may be attracted to firms with existing export networks as in Blonigen
et al. (forthcoming).
Firm age and government ownership are found to decrease the probability of being acquired
by foreigners. Foreign firms seem to also prefer domestic firms with less constrained financial
conditions: the leverage ratio decreases a firm’s probability of being acquired by foreigners, while
the liquidity ratio increases the probability. In a related study, Huang et al. (2008) seem to
document an opposite pattern: foreign investors are more likely to buy financially constrained
local firms. This discrepancy is mainly due to an important difference between our paper and
theirs. Our logit model only considers firms with ownership changes, while Huang et al.’s (2008)
sample contains all firms regardless of their ownership status. They find that among all firms,
foreign-acquired firms are more financially constrained, while we document that among firms for
sale, foreigners choose those with better financial conditions.14
For each foreign-acquired firm, we choose one domestic-acquired firm whose fitted value in the
logit model is the most similar to that of the foreign-acquired firm. We would like the matched
foreign-acquired firms and domestic-acquired firms to have pre-acquisition conditions that are as
similar as possible. Table 3 presents the results for the balance tests of matching covariates. The
second and third columns report, respectively, the means of covariates for foreign-acquired firms
14In addition, Huang et al. (2008) employ different variables to measure financial constraints and our samples also
cover different industries.
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and the means for the corresponding domestic-acquired firms that are matched to foreign-acquired
firms based on the estimated logit model. Column four displays the difference (in percentage)
between two group means (treatment group minus control group). The means of all covariates are
very similar between the treatment group and the control group: the differences are less than 3% in
most cases.15 The t-tests indicate that the differences in the means of the treatment group and the
control group are not statistically different from zero at the conventional significant levels. These
results suggest that the foreign-acquired firms and the matched domestic-acquired firms have very
similar pre-acquisition characteristics. Therefore, the post-acquisition performance differences are
more likely due to foreign ownership rather than endogenous selection biases.
Our annual data may suffer from the partial year effects discussed in Bernard et al. (2014). As a
robust check for the partial year effects, we repeat our logit model of the propensity score matching
by using firms’ pre-acquisition characteristics two years before the acquisition. Our empirical
findings hold up well in this case too.16 We will also show later that our empirical findings not
only hold in the acquisition year, but also in the two years following the acquisition. These results
suggest that the partial year effects may not significantly affect our main findings.
Our results are also robust under alternative matching methods. Results for the non-parametric
nearest neighbor matching and the nearest neighbor, propensity-score re-weighting matching are
reported in the appendix.
4 Empirical Results
As a first pass, we run simple OLS regressions with the data. Our benchmark difference-in-
differences model only includes the domestic-acquired firms that are paired with foreign-acquired
firms, giving zero weight to unpaired domestic-acquired firms. In the simple OLS regressions, all
domestic-acquired firms are used and help us check the robustness of our benchmark results.
The dependent variable in the simple OLS regressions is the accumulative change in firm perfor-
mance following the acquisition. Independent variables include a dummy variable indicating foreign
15Two exceptions are the real wage (4.2%) and the dummy variable for state/collectively owned (3.2%).
16The results are reported in the web appendix and we thank an anonymous referee for recommending this exercise
to us.
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acquisitions and a location dummy (provinces of target firms). We also include the independent
variables of the logit model to control for pre-acquisition differences across firms. We run six sets
of regressions in total and the dependent variables in these regressions are post-acquisition changes
in three measures of productivity (TFP, gross output per employee and value-added output per
employee), the leverage ratio, the liquidity ratio and the export share, respectively.
Table 4 summarizes these regressions.17 The first column shows the name of the dependent
variable in each regression, and each row presents the estimation results for the foreign acquisition
dummy. Besides coefficient estimates, robust standard errors clustered by province, year and in-
dustry and the corresponding p-values are also displayed in the table. In the first row, the change
in productivity as measured by TFP is used as the dependent variable. The coefficient estimate of
the foreign acquisition dummy is statistically significant in only one out of three cases (two years
after) at the 10% level, indicating no strong evidence that foreign acquisitions can improve target
firms’ productivity. Evidence based on other measures of productivity (gross output per employee
and value-added output per employee) is even weaker. For instance, when productivity is measured
by value-added output per employee, the coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant in all
three years we consider.
In contrast, we find strong evidence that foreign acquisitions can significantly improve target
firms’ financial conditions (decreases in the leverage ratio and increases in the liquidity ratio). The
coefficient estimates of the foreign acquisition dummy are significantly different from zero at the
1% or 5% level in all 9 cases. Similar results are also found for the regression using export shares
as the dependent variable. In these preliminary results, all observations are treated equally and
did not fully take into account the pre-acquisition differences between foreign-acquired firms and
their domestic counterparts. We will show next that our results hold up well after we take such
differences more seriously.
In our benchmark difference-in-differences results, we first focus on the effect of foreign acqui-
sitions on target firms’ productivity and highlight the importance of using domestic-acquired firms
as the control group. Then we extend our study to broader indicators of firm performance.
17The details of these regressions can be found in an appendix on the authors’ websites.
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4.1 Firm Productivity
Table 5 presents our benchmark results for firm productivity. In Panel A, firm TFP is employed as
a measure of productivity, and two control groups are considered here. The first control group is
picked from Chinese firms acquired by other domestic firms. In the second case, the control group
is chosen from the domestic firms that experienced no change in their ownership.18
We first focus on the case in which the control group is chosen from domestic-acquired firms.
In this case, TFP of foreign-acquired firms on average increased 6.2% relative to domestic-acquired
firms in the year of acquisition and the increase is statistically significant at the 5% level. However,
the productivity difference becomes insignificant in the following two years, though the coefficient
estimates remain positive. This is in sharp contrast to previous empirical findings that productivity
gains of foreign-acquired firms are statistically significant in the acquisition year and continue to be
significant in subsequent years. For instance, Arnold and Javorcik (2009) find that the productivity
advantage of acquired plants in Indonesia continued to increase and reached almost 13.5% by the
third year following the acquisition. Similar results are also documented by Yasar and Morrison
Paul (2007) for Turkish manufacturing plants.
An important difference between our paper and previous studies is that we use the domestic-
acquired firms as our control group to identify the purified effect of foreign ownership, while previous
studies choose the control group from all domestic firms. To make the point more salient, we re-
estimate our model using a control group chosen from domestic firms that experienced no ownership
change. In this case, we find larger productivity improvements for foreign-acquired firms relative
to the control group: in Table 5, the coefficient estimate is 8.1% in the acquisition year and
increased to 9.6% two years after the acquisition. Note that the coefficient estimate is only 3.1%
two years after the acquisition when domestic-acquired firms are used as the control group. In
18Alternatively we can employ the multi-value treatment effect model similar to Lechner (2002) to include foreign-
acquired firms, domestic-acquired firms and non-acquisition domestic firms in one model. However, it is not clear
how to apply the propensity score estimation method used in our paper (following Abadie and Imbens, 2009) to the
multi-value treatment effect model. Fukao et al. (2008) employ standard propensity score matching and difference-
in-differences techniques in a multinomial logit model and find that foreign acquisitions improve target firms’ pro-
ductivity and profits relative to acquisitions by domestic firms in Japan. However, under their nearest neighbor
matching method, different non-acquisition firms are used as the control group for domestic- and foreign-acquired
firms. Therefore, the differences between foreign-acquired and domestic-acquired firms are partly due to the fact that
the matching control sets are different for the two categories.
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addition, the coefficient estimates now become statistically significant for all three years, echoing
previous findings in the literature. These findings suggest that both foreign- and domestic-acquired
firms have experienced significant productivity gains due to acquisitions and such gains would be
inappropriately attributed to foreign ownership if they are not carefully controlled in estimation.
As robustness checks, we consider two alternative measures of productivity in Table 5: gross
output per employee and value-added output per employee. The evidence of productivity improve-
ment is even weaker: none of the coefficient estimates is significantly different from zero in the
acquisition year and in the subsequent two years after the acquisition. Some point estimates for
the coefficient of productivity even turn negative.
4.2 Financial Conditions, Exports and Other Performance
Recent literature emphasizes the financial channels through which FDI affects host countries’ e-
conomies. For instance, Alfaro et al. (2004) document that economies with better-developed
financial markets are able to benefit more from FDI to promote their economic growth. Their con-
jecture is that well-functioning local financial markets provide financing for technology spillovers
from FDI firms to local firms. Manova, Wei and Zhang (forthcoming) provide firm-level empir-
ical evidence that FDI to China can ease credit constraints for exporters and therefore promote
international trade.
We provide direct evidence for the causal effect of foreign ownership on firms’ financial conditions
and export performance. We show that this mechanism exists in the data even after controlling
for the effect in domestic acquisitions. Firm productivity in the above exercises is replaced with
two measures of financial conditions: the leverage and liquidity ratios. A robust finding is that
the financial conditions of foreign-acquired firms improve significantly relative to domestic-acquired
firms. In Table 6, the average leverage ratio of foreign-acquired firms declined relative to domestic-
acquired firms in the acquisition year and the following two years. In the acquisition year, the
leverage ratio of foreign-acquired firms declined 2.1 percentage points relative to domestic-acquired
firms. The difference remains at around 2 percentage points in the next two years. The coefficient
estimates in all three years are significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
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In contrast, the liquidity ratio of foreign-acquired firms increased relative to domestic-acquired
firms in the acquisition year and the subsequent two years. The coefficient estimates are significantly
different from zero at the 1% level for all three years. The liquidity ratio of foreign-acquired firms
increased 2.7 percentage points relative to domestic-acquired firms in the acquisition year. The
difference continued to increase in the following two years and reached 4.1 percentage points in the
second year following the acquisition. These findings suggest that foreign ownership significantly
reduces target firms’ reliance on external financing and increases the share of internal capital. The
robust findings on the leverage and liquidity ratios are in sharp contrast to the evidence that
foreign ownership does not significantly increase target firms’ TFP after controlling for the effect
in domestic acquisitions.
Manova, Wei and Zhang (forthcoming) argue that improved financial conditions help FDI firms
participate in international trade. We also document that foreign acquisition can significantly
improve target firms’ export performance. We compare the post-acquisition changes in export
shares (exports divided by total sales) of foreign-acquired and domestic-acquired firms and report
our results in the last panel of Table 6. In the year of acquisition, the export share of foreign-
acquired firms on average increased 3.2 percentage points relative to domestic-acquired firms. It is
2.9 percentage points and 2.7 percentage points in the first and second years, respectively, following
the acquisition. All coefficient estimates in these three years are significantly different from zero
at the 5% level. Note that the average pre-acquisition export share of foreign-acquired firms is
28%. Our results indicate a 10% increase in the export share for foreign-acquired firms relative
domestic-acquired firms following the acquisition.
Our sample covers the period of China’s accession to WTO, which may have changed the
ability of Chinese firms for exporting and receiving FDI. Rumbaugh and Blancher (2004) document
that WTO accession substantially contributed to China’s sustained growth in international trade.
Branstetter and Feenstra (2002) model the tradeoff of increased trade and FDI against the losses of
SOE due to such liberation. The WTO member ship may have promoted FDI activities in China
by removing export barriers, which is consistent with our findings.
Table 7 displays the results based on additional measures of firm performance: gross output,
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value-added output, employment, the real wage, the real profit and the real capital per worker. We
find some evidence that foreign ownership can improve output, employment and income even after
controlling for the effect in domestic acquisitions. Foreign ownership significantly increases total
output in the acquisition year and the following two years at the 5% level. The value-added output
of foreign-acquired firms increases about 10 percentage points relative to domestic-acquired firms
following the acquisition. Employment of foreign-acquired firms also increases by a similar amount
as output, indicating no significant improvement in productivity measured by output per worker
as we have shown.
The real wage in the foreign-acquired firms also increased significantly relative to that in the
domestic-acquired firms following the acquisition, while the real capital per worker of foreign-
acquired firms declined.19 These findings indicate a higher share of labor income in value-added
output per worker if the capital return remains constant. Recall that post-acquisition changes in
the productivity measured by value-added output per employee are about the same for domestic
and foreign acquisitions. In this case, the real wage of foreign-acquired firms can still increase,
relative to domestic-acquired firms, with a larger share of increases in value-added output going to
labor.
The decrease in capital per worker is consistent with the fact that FDI improves exports and
that China exports labor-intensive products. Ma, Tang and Zhang (2014) document that Chinese
firms become more labor intensive after exporting. They argue that labor-abundant countries, such
as China, allocate more resources to labor-intensive sectors to explore their comparative advantages
in international trade.
We barely find any evidence that foreign ownership can increase the real profit relative to
domestic-acquired firms. Although the real profit of foreign-acquired firms increased significantly
relative to domestic-acquired firms in the acquisition year, the increase becomes insignificant in
the following years. The results are robust when we use other measures of profitability such as the
profit ratio (total profits divided by total sales). This may be due to the fact that many FDI firms
in China are in highly competitive industries.
19Using establishment-level data for the UK, Girma and Go¨rg (2007) find sizable positive post-acquisition wage
effects following acquisitions by US firms, though no such effect is detected for firms acquired by EU firms.
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4.3 Discussions
In this section, we highlight and discuss some of the above results that may help to understand our
findings in a coherent framework.
First, we want to emphasize that both domestic and foreign acquisitions bring productivity
improvement relative to non-acquisition domestic firms.20 Like FDI, domestic acquisitions sig-
nificantly improved target firms’ productivity relative to non-acquisition domestic firms. TFP of
domestic-acquired firms increased about 10 percentage points relative to that of non-acquisition
firms in the acquisition year and the following two years. The coefficient estimates are statistically
significant at the 1% level in all three years. These results are consistent with previous findings
of post-acquisition productivity gains in the literature. For instance, Maksimovic and Phillips
(2001) show that most M&A transactions result in productivity gains using US plant-level data.
Guadalupe et al. (2012) document technology upgrading upon foreign acquisitions for Spanish
manufacturing firms. Intuitively, mergers and acquisitions facilitate the reallocation of resources
from less productive firms to more productive ones. Our results suggest that the amount of pro-
ductivity improvement is comparable for domestic and foreign acquisitions, leaving no additional
productivity gains from foreign ownership in our data.
Second, we confirm that the improvement of financial conditions in foreign acquisitions, rel-
ative to domestic acquisitions, is mainly from a financial improvement of foreign-acquired firms
rather than a financial deterioration of domestic-acquired firms. We compare the performance of
domestic-acquired firms relative to that of no-acquisition domestic firms and find no evidence that
the financial conditions of domestic-acquired firms improved or deteriorated after the acquisition
relative to non-acquisition firms. The results are presented in the appendix (Table A.7).21
Given the above clarifications, we next discuss potential factors that drive our results and relate
our findings to other studies in the literature. Our findings raise several interesting questions for
further studies. First, the finding of no additional productivity gain from foreign ownership may
20We have discussed this result for foreign-acquired firms in Panel A of Table 5. The comparison between domestic-
acquired firms and non-acquisition domestic firms is presented in Table A.7 of the appendix.
21In the appendix, we also confirm that the other documented performance improvements of foreign-acquired firms
are not driven by a performance deteriorations of the control group.
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seem puzzling, given that FDI improved target firms’ financial conditions. One would expect an
improvement in the acquired firms’ productivity if they invest in new technology after their financial
constraints are relaxed following the acquisition. As we just mentioned, foreign acquisitions do
increase target firms’ productivity but to a comparable extent as domestic acquisitions. Capital
input increased for both domestic- and foreign-acquired firms following acquisitions. Meanwhile,
labor input also increased in foreign acquisitions relative to domestic acquisitions. As a result, the
capital per employee of foreign-acquired firms even decreased slightly relative to that of domestic-
acquired firms (the last panel of Table 7), though the difference is statistically insignificant. This
explains why labor productivity (measured by output per employee) of foreign-acquired firms does
not increase relative to that of domestic-acquired firms.
Several factors may contribute to the absence of additional productivity gains for foreign-
acquired firms even if they became less financially constrained than before. As emphasized in
Manova, Wei and Zhang (forthcoming), international trade involves large fixed costs and the capi-
tal inflows from FDI can help financially-constrained local firms pay for the fixed costs and promote
exports. In this case, we may not observe an increase in productivity though exports and total
output increased after the acquisition.
In addition, improved financial conditions of foreign-acquired firms may give competition ad-
vantages that are not related to productivity. For instance, Fresard (2010) finds that high liquidity
helps firms to cope with unexpected market shocks and therefore leads to an increase in the market
share. Gamba and Triantis (2008) show that firms prefer to maintain financial flexibility when fac-
ing financial frictions and such flexibility increases firms’ overall market value. Therefore, the lower
leverage ratio and higher liquidity ratio of foreign-acquired firms as we documented may strength-
en the performance (e.g., output) of foreign-acquired firms even though they do not improve the
relative productivity.
The difference in the balance sheets of multinational affiliates and domestic firms may also reflect
the capital structure choices by multinational affiliates. Desai et al. (2004) document that U.S.
multinational affiliates utilize more internal borrowing and rely less on external finance in countries
with underdeveloped local capital markets. In addition, multinational affiliates may use balance
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sheets to circumvent capital controls as shown in Desai et al. (2006). The financial decisions based
on these considerations are not directly related to firm productivity.
Another interesting issue is on how FDI promotes target firms’ exports. As in Manova, Wei and
Zhang (forthcoming), FDI may relax firms’ financial constraints on fixed export costs, resulting in
more firms participating in international trade. In this case, the extensive margin is expected to
account for a larger share of the increase in exports for foreign-acquired firms than for domestic-
acquired firms as foreign acquisitions relax target firms’ financial constraints. We decompose the
changes in exports into extensive and intensive margins for foreign- and domestic-acquired firms in
our treatment and control groups. The extensive margin includes firms that did not export in the
pre-acquisition year but exported in the acquisition year or the two years following the acquisition.
The intensive margin includes firms that were exporters in the pre-acquisition year and continued
to export in the acquisition year or the following two years.22 In our data, the extensive margin
contributes to 38% of post-acquisition increases in exports for the foreign-acquired firms, while it
only accounts for 11% of export increases for domestic-acquired firms. These findings are consistent
with Manova, Wei and Zhang’s (forthcoming) prediction.
The role of foreign ownership in promoting trade could also go through the information channel
as emphasized in Fernandes and Tang (2014): FDI may have promoted trade by increasing target
firms knowledge about foreign markets.23 Table 8 compares the performance of FDI from Hong
Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT) and that from other countries.24 We find that the relative
strength of these two channels may depend on FDI’s sources of origin.
A large fraction of foreign acquisitions in China is from HMT. In our data, HMT acquisitions
account for 55% of the total assets of all acquisitions in 2001. The share declined during our sample
22More precise extensive margin measures should also include existing exporters that export to more markets
and/or more varieties of products.
23The increase in exports could also be a result of improved technology: Girma et al. (2012) apply a propensity
score reweighting estimator to Chinese manufacturing firms and find that foreign acquisitions have a strong effect on
R&D activities and exports. However, we do not find productivity improvement for foreign-acquired firms relative
to domestic-acquired firms in this paper.
24In this exercise, we first match foreign-acquired firms with domestic-acquired firms. Next we separate foreign-
acquired firms and their corresponding matched domestic-acquired firms into two sub-samples: HMT firms and FDI
firms from all other countries. Then the difference-in-differences estimation is applied to each of these two sub-samples.
Other studies on FDI from HMT include Huang et al. (2013) and Kamal (2014), among others.
22
period, but remains at about 30% in more recent years.25 No significant difference is detected
between HMT FDI and FDI from other countries based on their effects on firm productivity. To
save space, we do not report this result in the table.
Table 8 shows strong evidence that FDI from HMT can improve target firms’ financial con-
ditions. The leverage ratio of HMT-acquired firms declined relative to domestic-acquired firms
following the acquisition, and the decrease is statistically significant at the 1% level in all three
years. The evidence for the liquidity ratio is similar. We also find evidence that HMT-acquired
firms perform better than domestic-acquired firms in exports: the performance difference is statis-
tically significant in two out of three years at the 1% level. These findings are consistent with the
financial constraint channel of FDI in promoting exports in Manova, Wei and Zhang (forthcoming).
For the firms acquired by FDI from other countries, the evidence for financial condition im-
provement is weak: the coefficient estimate is statistically significant in two out of three years at the
10% level. However, we still find strong evidence that FDI from other countries can significantly
improve target firms’ exports: the export shares of foreign-acquired firms increased significantly
relative to domestic-acquired firms following the acquisition at the 1% level in all three years we
consider. The increase in the export share is also greater than that for HMT firms, suggesting
other channels (e.g., information) may also be at work.
It is of interest in the future to investigate the post-acquisition changes in export activities
of foreign-acquired firms using micro-level trade data to shed light on different channels through
which FDI promotes target firms’ exports.
4.4 Private and State Owned Firms
Due to issues related to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), mergers and acquisitions in China could
be very politicized, especially when they involve foreign ownerships. State and collectively owned
firms may be subject to implicit restrictions on foreign acquisitions and hence behave differently
relative to private firms. For instance, the government may prefer domestic private firms rather
than foreign firms to acquire state-owned enterprises to avoid the critiques from nationalists. These
25Kamal (2014) documents that the share of HMT FDI in total FDI declines from 60.8% in 2001 to 45.0% in 2006.
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implicit policies and rules on foreign investment may also vary across regions. In this case, the
conditional independence assumption may not hold: after controlling for observable characteristics
in propensity score estimation, unobserved heterogeneity may still affect firms’ chance of being
acquired by foreigners. In the benchmark result, we add a dummy of state/collective ownership
before acquisitions to alleviate this concern. In this section, we consider another two exercises to
address these issues. First, we restrict our sample to the firms that are privately owned prior to
acquisition. The above issue is less of a concern when we exclude state and collectively owned firms
from our sample.
Table 9 reports the results when we only include private firms in our estimation. As in the
benchmark model, there is no strong evidence that foreign acquisitions can significantly improve
firm TFP relative to domestic acquisitions. We find similar results when using other measures of
firm productivity such as output per employee. The results for the leverage and liquidity ratios are
statistically significant at the 1% level in five out of six cases and at the 5% level in the remaining
case. As in our benchmark model, foreign acquisitions are found to significantly promote exports
in all three years at the 1% level. Indeed, our results indicate a stronger effect of FDI on exports
for private firms: the coefficient estimates for private firms are more than 50% higher than those in
our benchmark model. This finding is consistent with the fact that private firms contribute more
than state-owned enterprises to China’s export increases after 2000.
In the second exercise, we include location as a key variable to match domestic- and foreign-
acquired firms.26 Matching on location allows us to control for the variation of FDI policy across
regions. In addition, it provides an additional control (besides a dummy of export status) on firms’
export potential as firms in certain regions of China are more likely to export. In a robustness check,
we add a province dummy to the logit model of the propensity-score matching of our benchmark
model. In an alternative exercise, we employ the nonparametric nearest neighbor matching method
in Abadie and Imbens (2006 and 2008) and require an exact match on location, state ownership
and acquisition year.27 The results for these two exercises of matching on location are reported in
26We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting we explore this issue.
27In the nonparametric matching method, the location dummy is an indicator showing if a province is among
coastal provinces (Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi,
Hainan). We did not use location dummies for individual provinces as in the propensity score matching method
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the appendix (Tables A.10 and A.11) and our main findings hold up well.
China undertook dramatic privatization in the late 1990s and the newly privatized domestic
firms are likely to become more financially constrained due to the loss of access to state capital. In
this case, it may bias our findings that foreign acquisitions improve target firms’ financial conditions
relative to domestic acquisitions. To check if privatization worsened target firms’ financial condition,
we compare the performance of privatized SOEs to that of surviving SOEs. In this exercise, the
treatment group includes domestic-acquired firms that were state-owned enterprises before the
acquisition. The control group contains SOEs that experienced no change in registration and are
paired with the firms in the control group by propensity score matching. We do not find evidence
that the target firms’s financial conditions deteriorated following the privatization and the results
are reported in the appendix (Table A.9). This may be due to the fact that China only privatized
SOEs that were losing money. As mentioned in Hsieh and Song (2015), the main purpose of China’s
privatization in the late 1990s was to solve the non-performing loans of state-owned firms. It is
likely that the privatized SOEs were already financially constrained before the acquisitions.28
4.5 Robustness Checks
Different Definitions for Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions
As we previously mentioned, our benchmark method of identifying acquisitions may not include
all acquisitions in our sample. We consider several robustness checks to address this concern.
First, we use all registration type changes as an indicator of acquisitions. Note that this method
overestimates the number of acquisitions because registration changes may also be due to changes
in other aspects such as legal status, instead of ownership.
Second, we consider a different definition of domestic acquisitions. In this case, the domestic
acquisitions include firms that changed registration types across different domestic groups as defined
in the benchmark model plus two additional cases. In the first case, we consider all registration
type changes in the group of mixed domestic firms as domestic acquisitions. The group of mixed
because the choice for the control group will be extremely limited in this case.
28The finding here should be interpreted with caution since the financial conditions of privatized and surviving
SOEs were different before the acquisitions.
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domestic firms contains firms with heterogeneous backgrounds and registration type changes within
this group are also likely to be mergers and acquisitions. There are about 200 observations annually
for these registration type changes. In the second case, we consider as domestic acquisitions the
registration type changes in which state- or collectively-owned enterprises changed to state-owned
LLC. There are about 30 observations in each year for this case. Then we repeat our benchmark
difference-in-differences exercise and find that our benchmark results hold up qualitatively well.
In another robustness check, we employ changes in the foreign capital share to identify foreign
acquisitions. Following the literature, we use 10% as the cutoff for FDI firms: foreign acquisitions
include all firms whose foreign capital share increased from below 10% before the acquisition to
above 10% after. Our results are also robust when 25% is used as the cutoff, which is usually the
minimum requirement in China for a firm to register and FDI firm.
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) document that the ownership structure affects the extent of
technology spillovers of FDI firms. In particular, they find that multinationals are less likely to
transfer sophisticated technologies to their partially owned subsidies than to wholly owned ones.
In a robustness check, we only include FDI firms that are wholly owned by foreigners before the
acquisitions.
The results of these robustness checks are qualitatively similar to our benchmark results and
are reported in the appendix (Tables A.12-A.15).
Industries with Different Labor Intensities
Our results are also robust across industries with different labor intensities. Huang et al. (2008)
argue that finance is an important factor explaining FDI inflows in China’s labor-intensive industries
such as garments. Labor-intensive industries are usually characterized by low technology and high
competition. Therefore, the advantages of FDI firms are likely to come from easy access to credit
rather than advanced technology for these industries. We divide 30 industries (at 2-digit industry
code level) in our sample into three groups with 10 industries in each group: high, medium and
low labor-intensive industries.
Table A.16 in the appendix presents the results for these three industrial groups. For all indus-
trial groups, there is no significant evidence that foreign-acquired firms became more productive
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relative to domestic-acquired ones following the acquisition. Instead, for low labor-intensive in-
dustries, we find some evidence that foreign-acquired firms became even less productive relative
to domestic-acquired firms. However, such results disappear when we use other measures of firm
productivity such as output per employee. As for financial constraints, the results for the liquidity
ratio are quite robust across all industrial groups, though the results are less robust for the leverage
ratio. The liquidity ratio significantly improved in 7 out of 9 cases at the 10% level.
The results for exports also hold well across industries with different labor intensities: in 7 out
of 9 cases, we find foreign-acquired firms outperform their domestic-acquired counterparts in export
shares following the acquisition at the 10% level. It may sound puzzling that China’s export shares
in capital-intensive sectors also increased after foreign acquisitions since the country’s comparative
advantage is on labor-intensive products. However, this finding is consistent with the cross-sectional
results in Manova, Wei and Zhang (forthcoming). They find that financial constraints limit trade
similarly after controlling for capital intensity. However, FDI can relax greater financial constraints
in more capital-intensive industries because capital-intensive industries are usually more financially
constrained. In this case, the increases in exports due to removing financial constraints may more
than offset the decreases induced by shifting to exporting labor-intensive products.
Exporters vs. Non-exporters
Our results are also robust when we separately estimate production functions for exporters and
non-exporters. We separate exporters and non-exporters for two reasons. First, capital intensity
may be different for exporters and non-exporters and it is problematic to estimate their productivity
using the same production function.29 Ma, Tang and Zhang (2014) document that Chinese firms
become less capital intensive after exporting and we find in this paper that FDI promotes the
exports of target firms. Therefore, it could be problematic to use the same production function
to estimate firm TFP prior to and after acquisition. For instance, if a firm becomes an exporter
following the acquisition, the capital share in the production function will decrease. If we do not
take this change into account, the estimated TFP could be seriously biased. Following Ma, Tang
29More generally, the production structure may have changed following an acquisition. The robustness check here
may at least partially address this concern.
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and Zhang (2014), we separate our observations according to firms’ exporting status and estimate
productivity separately for exporters and non-exporters.
Second, we separate exporters and non-exporters to check whether exports increased for both
groups following the acquisition. FDI can improve exports through two different channels. First, it
could relax the financial constraints of non-exporters and enable them to participate in the interna-
tional trade following the acquisition (extensive margin) as argued in Manova et al. (forthcoming).
Alternatively, it could improve existing exporters’ performance (intensive margin), for example, by
better utilizing their export networks as discussed in Blonigen et al. (forthcoming). Separating
exporters and non-exporters allows us to examine these two different channels.
Observations in each year are divided into two groups: one is for firms with positive exports and
the other for firms with no exports. Then we estimate TFP for each group separately. Next, we
divide firms into exporters and non-exporters based on their pre-acquisition status. Following Ma,
Tang and Zhang (2014), if a firm exported in one or more years before acquisition, it is classified
as an exporter. Otherwise, the firm is classified as a non-exporter. The difference-in-differences
method is applied to exporters and non-exporters respectively to check if foreign acquisition has
different impacts on firms with different pre-acquisition export statuses.
Table A.17 in the appendix reports results for exporters and non-exporters. For both types
of firms, there is no significant evidence that foreign acquisitions can improve target firms’ TFP
relative to domestic acquisitions. Financial conditions for both exporters and non-exporters improve
following the acquisition and the improvement is statistically significant in most cases. For export
shares, we find a significant increase for non-exporters: the export share of firms that did not export
before the acquisition increased between 4 to 6 percentage points following the acquisition. The
increase in export share is statistically significant in all three years at the 1% level. This result
is consistent with previous studies that the surviving firms that switched from non-exporters to
exporters contribute significantly to China’s export growth. Manova and Zhang (2009) document
that surviving firms that start to export account for 70% of China’s export growth between 2003-
2005, while new firms explain the remaining 30%.
The coefficient estimates of the export share are statistically insignificant for exporters in all
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three years considered in our exercise. However, this finding does not conclude that foreign acqui-
sitions do not improve target firms’ export performance relative to domestic acquisitions. We have
shown earlier that foreign acquisitions improve target firms’ output. As a result, there may be no
significant difference in the changes of the export share between foreign- and domestic-acquired
firms, even though the exports of foreign-acquired firms increased relative to domestic-acquired
firms following the acquisition. In the last panel of Table A.17, we report the results for exports
and find that for both exporters and non-exporters, the exports of foreign acquired firms signifi-
cantly increased relative to domestic acquired firms. The difference is statistically significant for
all 6 cases at the 10% level.30 This finding suggests that FDI also contributes to the increase in
China’s exports through the intensive margin.
Processing-trade Foreign Acquisitions
Our main results are not driven by the processing trade in China. Processing trade is an
important type of international trade in developing countries such as China, Indonesia and Mexico.
In processing trade, domestic firms import all or part of their raw materials and intermediate inputs
to process or assemble their final goods, which are re-exported to foreign countries. Firms with
low-productivity and unskilled labor are usually involved in processing trade (e.g., Yu, forthcoming
and Manova and Yu, 2011), which may bias our finding that foreign acquisitions do not improve
target firms’ productivity relative to domestic acquisitions.
The Chinese transaction-level customs data indicate whether exported products are for pro-
cessing trade or not, and we use such information to identify processing-trade firms.31 In each
year, firms are designated as processing-trade firms if they claim any of their exports as processing
trade. Among 2,240 foreign acquisitions between 2001 and 2005 in our dataset, 332 target firms
participated in processing trade in the pre-acquisition year. To control for firms’ pre-acquisition
processing-trade status, a dummy variable is added to the logit model in the propensity-score
matching. Then we divide foreign-acquired firms (and their matched domestic-acquired firms) into
30Exports are measured by log(1 + real exports), where real exports equal nominal exports divided by industrial-
level PPI (2-digit level). We add one to real exports before taking logs because many firms have zero exports in one
or more years. Due to this reason, the coefficient estimates cannot be interpreted as percentage increases in exports.
31We thank Zhi Yu for providing identifications of processing-trade firms, which are obtained by combining trade
data from the Chinese Customs Office and our firm-level data from the Annual Surveys of Industrial Production.
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two groups according to their post-acquisition processing-trade status. The group of processing-
trade foreign acquisitions include all foreign-acquired firms that are involved in processing trade
after the acquisition. The remaining foreign-acquired firms, referred to as other foreign acquisitions,
either conduct ordinary international trade or do not export at all after the acquisition. Then we
perform the same difference-in-differences estimation for these two groups of firms.
As in the benchmark model, we do not find evidence of productivity improvement for either
processing-trade foreign acquisitions or other foreign acquisitions. There exists strong evidence
that foreign acquisitions improved target firms’ financial conditions based on the liquidity ratio.
The liquidity ratio increased significantly at the 1% level for the foreign-acquired firms regardless of
their processing-trade status. The results for the leverage ratio remain strong for the group of other
foreign acquisitions, while they are weak for foreign acquisitions involving processing trade. For
both groups of foreign-acquired firms, the export share significantly increased relative to domestic
acquired firms following the acquisition.
5 Conclusion
It is well believed, especially among policymakers in developing countries, that FDI can improve
the host country’s productivity by the direct introduction of new technology/management and the
spillover from FDI firms to local firms. Part of the belief is from the empirical findings of post-
acquisition performance improvement for foreign-acquired firms. However, such empirical evidence
may have disguised the true channel through which FDI promotes the host country’s economic
growth and labor income if we do not carefully take into account the general acquisition effect that
also exists in domestic acquisitions.
Using firm-level data for China during the period of 2000-2007, our study identifies the purified
effect of foreign ownership by employing domestic-acquired firms as the control group. We find
that, relative to domestic-acquired firms, foreign acquisitions did not significantly increase Chinese
firms’ productivity. However, we do find that foreign ownership can significantly improve target
firms’ financial conditions as measured by the leverage and liquidity ratios even after controlling
30
for the effect in domestic acquisitions. Foreign ownership is also found to promote target firms’
exports, output, employment and the real wage. These findings provide support for the recent
emphasis on the financial channel through which FDI promotes international trade, labor income
and economic growth of host countries.
Many developing countries provide tax and other incentives to attract FDI inflows. Such fi-
nancial and policy incentives may not be as effective as providing a macroeconomic environment
that can help the FDI firms best utilize their comparative advantages. Our results show that
an important advantage of FDI acquisitions, relative to domestic acquisitions, is to promote the
international trade of the host country through improving target firms’ financial conditions (and
maybe through other channels too). In this case, a more effective way to attract FDI inflows is
to remove trade barriers through free trade agreements and WTO membership. Our results also
suggest that FDI inflows to emerging markets, such as China, may reflect the inefficiency of their
financial markets. To some extent, FDI inflow is an indicator of the extent of such financial mar-
ket inefficiency. Therefore, the increase in the volume of FDI inflows should not always be the
top priority of government officials. The long-run goal for these emerging markets is to improve
their financial markets’ efficiency through reforms, rather than provide tax or policy incentives to
maintain the level of FDI inflows.
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Figure 1: TFP of Foreign- and Domestic-acquired Firms Across Time
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–TFP is measured by firm TFP minus the industrial average and divided by the industrial standard deviation. See Section
5 for details. The domestic-acquired firms are matched with the foreign-acquired firms based on their characteristics in the
pre-acquisition year.
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Table 2: Estimation Results of the Logit Model
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
TFP 0·056∗ 0·031 1·800 0·072 −0·005 0·118
Employment 0·111∗∗∗ 0·022 4·960 0·000 0·067 0·155
Real wage 0·286∗∗∗ 0·039 7·320 0·000 0·209 0·363
Age −0·045∗∗∗ 0·003 −14·510 0·000 −0·051 −0·039
Real capital per worker 0·123∗∗∗ 0·023 5·330 0·000 0·078 0·168
Export status 1·118∗∗∗ 0·056 20·140 0·000 1·009 1·227
Leverage ratio −0·332∗∗ 0·137 −2·420 0·016 −0·601 −0·063
Liquidity ratio 0·503∗∗∗ 0·129 3·900 0·000 0·250 0·757
Dummy of state/collectively owned −0·821∗∗∗ 0·055 −14·920 0·000 −0·929 −0·714
– All variables are measured in their pre-acquisition year except for age.
– Employment, Real wage and Real capital/worker are in logarithms.
– Export status is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is an exporter and zero otherwise.
– Dummy of state/collectively owned equals one if the firm is a state or collectively owned enterprise and
zero otherwise.
– Results for the acquisition year dummy and the industry dummy (2-digit level industrial code) are not
reported in the table to save space.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Table 3: Balance Test of Matching Covariates in Propensity Score Matching
Mean t-test
Treatment Control Bias (%) t p > |t|
TFP 0·29 0·28 1·50 0·48 0·63
Employment 5·19 5·22 −2·30 −0·75 0·45
Real wage 2·28 2·24 4·20 1·35 0·18
Age 7·99 8·05 −0·70 −0·23 0·82
Real capital per worker 3·67 3·69 −1·30 −0·43 0·67
Export status 0·48 0·47 2·50 0·81 0·42
Leverage ratio 0·54 0·54 −0·10 −0·05 0·96
Liquidity ratio 0·11 0·12 −2·90 −0·92 0·36
Dummy of state/collective owned 0·30 0·28 3·20 1·03 0·30
– See footnotes in Table 2 for details about the variables in this table.
– Columns two and three report the means of the treatment and control groups, respectively.
– Column “Bias (%)” displays the percentage deviations of the mean of the treatment group
from that of the control group (
treatment group mean - control group mean
treatment group mean × 100).
– The null hypothesis of the t-test is that the treatment and control groups have the same
sample means.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 4: Results for OLS Regressions
Dependent Acquisition year One year after Two years after
variable Coeff. Std. Err P > |z| Coeff. Std. Err P > |z| Coeff. Std. Err P > |z|
Productivity 1 0·021 0·017 0·231 −0·009 0·021 0·673 0·043∗ 0·026 0·098
Productivity 2 −0·028∗ 0·014 0·051 −0·035∗ 0·018 0·049 −0·022 0·024 0·345
Productivity 3 −0·001 0·021 0·963 −0·036 0·025 0·150 0·003 0·030 0·930
Leverage ratio −0·019∗∗∗ 0·003 0·000 −0·021∗∗∗ 0·005 0·000 −0·015∗∗ 0·006 0·019
Liquidity ratio 0·029∗∗∗ 0·005 0·000 0·036∗∗∗ 0·007 0·000 0·036∗∗∗ 0·009 0·000
Export share 0·027∗∗∗ 0·005 0·000 0·032∗∗∗ 0·005 0·000 0·028∗∗∗ 0·008 0·000
– This table reports the estimation results of the simple OLS regressions discussed in Section 4. Only the results
for the foreign acquisition dummy are reported in the table and complete estimation results are displayed in the
appendix (Tables A.3-A.6).
– The first column shows the dependent variable of each regression and each row presents the estimation results
for the foreign acquisition dummy.
– We consider three measures of firm productivity: Productivity 1 is measured by firm TFP, Productivity 2 is
measured by gross output per employee and Productivity 3 is measured by value-added output per employee. In
all cases, the dependent variable is the change in log productivity following acquisitions.
– In rows “Leverage ratio”, “Liquidity ratio” and “Export share”, the dependent variable is, respectively, the
change in the leverage ratio, the change in the liquidity ratio and the change in the export share.
– The independent variables in all regressions include industry, year and location dummies, a dummy for foreign
acquisitions and pre-acquisition characteristics (a dummy for exporter, a dummy for state-owned enterprises,
log employment, log real wage, log real capital per worker, log age, the leverage ratio and liquidity ratio, log
productivity).
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 5: Benchmark Results for Productivity
Panel A: TFP as a measure of productivity
Control group: domestic-acquired firms
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·062∗∗ 0·025 2·480 0·013 0·013 0·111
One year after 0·003 0·032 0·090 0·930 −0·060 0·066
Two years after 0·031 0·035 0·900 0·369 −0·037 0·099
Control group: domestic firms with no acquisition
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·081∗∗ 0·036 2·240 0·025 0·010 0·152
One year after 0·080∗∗ 0·039 2·070 0·039 0·004 0·157
Two years after 0·096∗∗ 0·046 2·060 0·040 0·005 0·187
Panel B: Gross output per employee as a measure of productivity
Control group: domestic-acquired firms
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·011 0·023 0·480 0·633 −0·034 0·056
One year after 0·016 0·029 0·550 0·581 −0·041 0·073
Two years after −0·045 0·034 −1·320 0·186 −0·112 0·022
Panel C: Value-added output per employee as a measure of productivity
Control: domestic-acquired firms
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·023 0·028 0·850 0·398 −0·031 0·078
One year after 0·034 0·038 0·880 0·377 −0·041 0·109
Two years after −0·012 0·044 −0·280 0·782 −0·098 0·074
– This table reports the benchmark results for the effect of foreign ownership on target
firms’ productivity.
– Panels A, B and C use TFP, gross output per employee and value-added output per
employee as the measure of firm productivity, respectively.
– Panel A considers two cases for the control group: firms that are acquired by domestic
firms in the first case (the benchmark model) and firms that experienced no acquisition in
the second case.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 6: Benchmark Results for Financial Conditions and Exports
Leverage ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year −0·021∗∗∗ 0·006 −3·500 0·000 −0·034 −0·009
One year after −0·021∗∗∗ 0·007 −2·810 0·005 −0·035 −0·006
Two years after −0·020∗∗ 0·009 −2·210 0·027 −0·038 −0·002
Liquidity ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·027∗∗∗ 0·008 3·420 0·001 0·012 0·042
One year after 0·041∗∗∗ 0·009 4·480 0·000 0·023 0·059
Two years after 0·041∗∗∗ 0·011 3·570 0·000 0·018 0·063
Export share
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·032∗∗∗ 0·009 3·590 0·000 0·014 0·049
One year after 0·029∗∗∗ 0·010 2·980 0·003 0·010 0·048
Two years after 0·027∗∗ 0·012 2·300 0·022 0·004 0·050
– This table reports the benchmark results for the effect of foreign ownership on target
firms’ financial conditions and exports.
– The treatment group includes foreign-acquired firms and the control group includes
domestic-acquired firms that are paired with foreign-acquired firms using the propensity
score matching method.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 7: Benchmark Results for Other Performance
Gross output
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·051∗∗ 0·021 2·510 0·012 0·011 0·092
One year after 0·088∗∗∗ 0·026 3·440 0·001 0·038 0·138
Two years after 0·106∗∗∗ 0·036 2·950 0·003 0·036 0·177
Value-added output
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·119∗∗∗ 0·029 4·110 0·000 0·062 0·176
One year after 0·083∗∗ 0·036 2·290 0·022 0·012 0·155
Two years after 0·101∗∗ 0·043 2·370 0·018 0·017 0·184
Employment
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·070∗∗∗ 0·019 3·640 0·000 0·032 0·108
One year after 0·091∗∗∗ 0·025 3·690 0·000 0·043 0·140
Two years after 0·118∗∗∗ 0·032 3·760 0·000 0·057 0·180
Real wage
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·051∗∗ 0·021 2·490 0·013 0·011 0·092
One year after 0·059∗∗ 0·026 2·300 0·021 0·009 0·109
Two years after 0·075∗∗∗ 0·025 3·000 0·003 0·026 0·124
Real profit
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·125∗∗ 0·051 2·480 0·013 0·026 0·224
One year after 0·047 0·065 0·730 0·466 −0·080 0·174
Two years after −0·069 0·081 −0·850 0·395 −0·229 0·090
Real capital per worker
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year −0·080∗∗∗ 0·026 −3·010 0·003 −0·132 −0·028
One year after −0·050 0·034 −1·490 0·138 −0·117 0·016
Two years after −0·029 0·045 −0·640 0·520 −0·118 0·060
– This table reports the benchmark results for the effect of foreign ownership on target
firms’ other performance. All measures of firm performance are in logarithms.
– The treatment group includes foreign-acquired firms and the control group includes
domestic-acquired firms that are paired with foreign-acquired firms using the propensity
score matching method.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 8: Effects of FDI from Different Sources
Panel A: Firms from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan
Leverage ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year −0·019∗∗∗ 0·006 −3·317 0·001 −0·030 −0·008
One year after −0·038∗∗∗ 0·007 −5·387 0·000 −0·051 −0·024
Two years after −0·018∗∗∗ 0·007 −2·621 0·009 −0·032 −0·005
Liquidity ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·023∗∗ 0·011 2·122 0·034 0·002 0·044
One year after 0·062∗∗∗ 0·011 5·790 0·000 0·041 0·083
Two years after 0·056∗∗∗ 0·012 4·681 0·000 0·033 0·079
Export share
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·027∗∗∗ 0·008 3·326 0·001 0·011 0·044
One year after 0·029∗∗∗ 0·007 3·865 0·000 0·014 0·043
Two years after 0·029∗∗∗ 0·008 3·739 0·000 0·014 0·044
Panel B: Firms from other countries
Leverage ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year −0·025∗∗∗ 0·006 −4·178 0·000 −0·036 −0·013
One year after −0·002 0·006 −0·277 0·782 −0·013 0·010
Two years after −0·023∗∗∗ 0·007 −3·055 0·002 −0·037 −0·008
Liquidity ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·032∗∗∗ 0·010 3·287 0·001 0·013 0·051
One year after 0·017 0·011 1·645 0·100 −0·003 0·038
Two years after 0·023∗ 0·013 1·756 0·079 −0·003 0·049
Export share
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·031∗∗∗ 0·007 4·328 0·000 0·017 0·045
One year after 0·053∗∗∗ 0·007 7·454 0·000 0·039 0·067
Two years after 0·045∗∗∗ 0·008 5·315 0·000 0·028 0·061
– This table reports the results for the effect of foreign ownership on target firms’ financial
conditions and exports for FDI with different sources of origin.
– The treatment group in panels A and B includes foreign-acquired firms from different
sources and the control group includes domestic-acquired firms that are paired with these
foreign-acquired firms using the propensity score matching method.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 9: Results for Private Firms Only
Productivity (as measured by TFP)
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·080∗∗ 0·034 2·401 0·016 0·015 0·146
One year after −0·015 0·037 −0·405 0·686 −0·087 0·057
Two years after −0·024 0·037 −0·647 0·518 −0·098 0·049
Leverage ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year −0·031∗∗∗ 0·008 −4·136 0·000 −0·046 −0·016
One year after −0·036∗∗∗ 0·009 −4·064 0·000 −0·053 −0·019
Two years after −0·022∗∗ 0·010 −2·278 0·023 −0·041 −0·003
Liquidity ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·043∗∗∗ 0·011 3·992 0·000 0·022 0·064
One year after 0·059∗∗∗ 0·012 4·741 0·000 0·035 0·083
Two years after 0·045∗∗∗ 0·013 3·377 0·000 0·019 0·071
Export share
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·037∗∗∗ 0·010 3·544 0·000 0·016 0·057
One year after 0·039∗∗∗ 0·012 3·353 0·000 0·016 0·062
Two years after 0·042∗∗∗ 0·012 3·531 0·000 0·018 0·065
– This table reports the results for the firms that were privately owned before the acqui-
sition.
– The treatment group includes foreign-acquired firms and the control group includes
domestic-acquired firms that are paired with foreign-acquired firms using the propensity
score matching method.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Appendix (not for publication)
A.1 Summary Statistics
Table A.1: Summary Statistics
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
TFP 0·161 0·861 0·130 0·873 0·112 0·924 0·083 0·957 0·087 0·947
Employment 5·195 1·161 5·177 1·161 5·124 1·168 5·030 1·165 5·065 1·183
Real wage 1·986 0·694 2·073 0·709 2·134 0·708 2·319 0·552 2·417 0·589
Real capital/worker 3·587 1·213 3·665 1·229 3·718 1·265 3·745 1·297 3·815 1·282
Age 14·231 14·041 14·132 13·904 13·174 13·434 11·680 12·471 12·051 12·498
Export share 0·101 0·255 0·104 0·260 0·107 0·265 0·111 0·271 0·106 0·26
Leverage ratio 0·590 0·232 0·580 0·234 0·570 0·236 0·576 0·237 0·560 0·240
Liquidity ratio 0·027 0·347 0·037 0·324 0·044 0·316 0·041 0·345 0·051 0·328
– This table displays the summary statistics of variables for domestic- and foreign-acquired firms in our data.
– See Section 3 for data description and the definitions of variables in the table.
– Variables of TFP, Employment, Real wage and Real capital/worker are in logarithms and other variables are in levels.
A.2 Firm TFP and Econometric Strategy
Firm TFP
Firm TFP is calculated following Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) and re-scaled around the
industry TFP mean and divided by the industry TFP standard deviation.1
Consider the following production function for firm i in a given industry:
yit = βkkit + βllit + ωit + εit, (A.0.1)
where yit is the log of output, kit is the log of capital input and lit is the log of labor input. In our
data, yit and kit are measured by log value-added output and log fixed assets, respectively. Both
1See De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) for an example of using this method.
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variables are deflated by 2-digit industrial level PPI. lit is measured by the logarithm of the number
of employees. These variables are observable to the econometrician. ωit is the TFP shock that is
observable to the firm, but unobservable to the econometrician. εit is the error term that is not
predictable to the firm. OLS cannot be used to estimate equation (A.0.1) if the choice of kit or lit
is a function of ωit, which is likely to be true in reality. We follow Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer
(2006) to solve this endogeneity issue.
First assume ωit follows an exogenous first-order Markov process:
p(ωit+1|It) = p(ωit+1|ωt), (A.0.2)
where It is firm i’s information set at time t. It is further assumed that the firm’s intermediate
input is determined after its choices of labor and capital input and the realization of ωit. Suppose
the demand for intermediate input takes the form of:
mit = ft(ωit, kit, lit). (A.0.3)
It is assumed that ft is monotonic in ωit. Therefore, we can invert the input demand function to
get ωit:
ωit = f
−1
t (mit, kit, lit). (A.0.4)
Substituting equation (A.0.4) to (A.0.1), we have:
yit = βkkit + βllit + f
−1
t (mit, kit, lit) + εit
= Φt(mit, kit, lit) + εit,
where Φt(mit, kit, lit) ≡ βkkit + βllit + f−1t (mit, kit, lit). We employ a second-order polynomial
approximation for f−1t (mit, kit, lit). So the estimate of Φt(mit, kit, lit), Φ̂t(mit, kit, lit), is obtained
46
by regressing yit on mit, kit, lit and their second-order terms.
2
Next, two moment conditions are employed to estimate βk and βl:
E
ξit
 kit
lit

 = 0, (A.0.5)
where ξit = ωit − E[ωit|ωit−1] is the innovation in ωit. These two moment conditions are from the
assumption that capital and labor inputs are chosen before the realization of ωit.
To be specific, for given β̂k and β̂l, we have:
ω̂it = Φ̂t(mit, kit, lit)− β̂kkit − β̂llit. (A.0.6)
Then ξ̂it is obtained with a third-order polynomial approximation by regressing ω̂it on ω̂it−1, ω̂2it−1
and ω̂3it−1. In the estimation, β̂k and β̂l are selected to minimize the sample analogue to the moment
conditions in equation (A.0.5):
min
β̂k,β̂l
Λ =
1
T
1
N
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
ξ̂it(β̂k, β̂l)
 kit
lit
 , (A.0.7)
where T is the number of sample periods and N is the number of firms in the industry.
In our exercise, we first group firms according to China’s 2-digit industry code. For each
industry, we follow the above procedure to estimate firms’ TFP during the period 2000-2007 (T = 8).
In this way, we allow βk and βl to vary across different industries, but to remain constant over time.
In our estimation, kit is measured by the fixed assets reported in a firm’s balance sheet, lit
is measured by the total number of employees and mit is measured by the intermediate inputs
reported in the firm’s income statement. Both fixed assets and intermediate inputs are deflated by
industry-level PPI obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook.
Given the estimated β̂k and β̂l from equation (A.0.7), we can calculate firm i’s TFP in year t,
2Cross terms of these variables are also included in the regression.
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ω̂it, from equation (A.0.6). Then ω̂it is normalized around the industrial mean:
ω˜it =
ω̂it − µt
σt
, (A.0.8)
where µt is the industrial mean of ω̂it and σt is the standard deviation of ω̂it. ω˜it is our final measure
of firm i’s TFP in all our empirical exercises.
Econometric Strategy
Formally, let Wi ∈ {0, 1} be the treatment indicator for acquired firm i. Wi = 1 if firm i is
acquired by foreigners and Wi = 0 if it is acquired by a domestic firm. We focus on the difference in
firm performance before (b) and after (a) acquisition, Y ai − Y bi . Ideally, if we have the observation
that firm i is acquired by a foreign firm, as well as the observation that the same firm i is acquired
by a domestic firm while keeping everything else constant:
Y ai − Y bi =
 Y
a
i (1)− Y bi (1), for Wi = 1
Y ai (0)− Y bi (0), for Wi = 0
then the average treatment effect for these firms can be measured by:
β = E
[(
Y ai (1)− Y bi (1)
)
−
(
Y ai (0)− Y bi (0)
)]
.
However, we observe in the data that firm i is acquired by either foreigners or domestic agents,
but not both. Therefore, it is impossible to compare the same firm’s performance after a foreign
acquisition with its performance following a domestic acquisition. Instead, we have to find a coun-
terfactual estimate of firm i’s missing observation and compare it with the observed performance
of firm i. For instance, if firm i is acquired by foreigners, we use a domestic-acquired firm j as firm
i’s counterfactual estimate. In this case, we would like to have the pre-acquisition characteristics
of firms i and j be as similar as possible. To achieve this goal, the following matching method is
employed to pair foreign- and domestic-acquired firms.
Let X be a k-dimension vector of covariates that are used in matching. If the chance of
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being acquired by a foreign or domestic firm is independent of the target firm’s performance after
controlling for X,3 the average treatment effect of the treated group can be calculated from:
β = E
[
E
[
Y a − Y b|W = 1, X = x
]
− E
[
Y a − Y b|W = 0, X = x
]
|W = 1
]
.
To estimate β, we first use the probability of being acquired by a foreign firm conditional on X,
p(X) = Pr(W = 1|X), as the propensity score to match foreign-acquired and domestic-acquired
firms, and p(X) is estimated from a logit model. We will describe the variables in X when presenting
our results for the logit model in section 3.2. Next, we find our control group firms by applying the
nearest neighbor matching method, which matches foreign-acquired firms with domestic-acquired
firms with the closest propensity scores. With the treatment group and control group firms, we
can estimate β from:
βˆ =
1
N
 N∑
i=1
(
Y ai − Y bi
)
−
N∑
j=1
(
Y aj − Y bj
) ,
where i and j are indexes for the treatment group and the control group, respectively, and N is
the number of matched firm pairs.
A.3 Data Cleaning Procedure
This section describes our data cleaning procedure. The original data set has around 1,991,000
observations between 2000 and 2007. The following criteria are applied to clean our data:
• Firms are in the manufacturing industries (2-digit industry code: 13-37, 39-43).
• Firms must have non-missing and unique identification numbers.
• Firms must have non-missing registration types and positive total subscribed capital. Fur-
thermore, under the subscribed capital, at least one of the following five variables must be
3This is referred to as the conditional independence assumption (CIA) or conditional unconfoundedness in the
literature.
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positive: government capital, collective capital, corporate/private capital, Hong Kong, Macau
and Taiwan capital, and foreign capital. This requirement helps us to double check the firms’
ownerships that we identify from their registration types.
• Firms must have positive value added, employment and fixed asset, which are used in the
calculation of firm productivity.
• Firms must have positive total assets and total liabilities, and non-missing current assets and
current liabilities. In addition, the total assets must be higher than current assets or fixed
assets. These requirements guarantee that the leverage and liquidity ratios are appropriately
defined.
After this cleaning procedure, the data set contains around 974,000 observations and lost half of
original observations. Similar data attrition exists in other studies that use the same Chinese data
set to study issues related to firms’ financial constraints. For instance, Feenstra et al. (forthcoming)
cleaned their data in a similar way and lost half of observations. Their final data set contains
963,180, which is comparable to our sample size.
Next, we obtain our final data set with domestic- and foreign-acquired firms from the above
cleaned data set as we have described in the paper.
A.4 Registration Types of Chinese Firms
Table A.2 shows the registration types of Chinese firms. Some registration types only exist in China
and we explain briefly here. State-owned enterprises are enterprises that are wholly owned by the
state, excluding state-owned LLC. Collectively owned enterprises are owned by local government
or collectively owned by employees. These enterprises used to be owned by the state, but later
were separated from state-owned enterprises to reduce fiscal expenses of the central government.
For Joint-stock cooperative enterprises, their stakes are owned by employees and external private
individual owners. Jointly operated enterprises are jointly owned by two or more legal entities
and organizations. HMT investment enterprises include firms that are partially or fully owned by
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investors from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. Enterprises that are partially or fully owned by
investors from other countries are registered as foreign investment enterprises. The share of foreign
capital for HMT and foreign investment LLCs is required to be at least 25%.
We divide the registration types into four categories: 1) state or collectively owned domestic
firms; 2) privately owned domestic firms; 3) mixed domestic firms; and 4) FDI firms.
Table A.2: Registration Types of Chinese Firms
Registration code Registration type
100 Domestic enterprise
110 State-owned enterprise
120 Collectively owned enterprise
130 Joint-stock cooperative enterprise
140 Jointly operated enterprise
141 State-owned jointly operated enterprise
142 Collectively owned jointly operated enterprise
143 State and collectively owned jointly operated enterprise
149 Other jointly operated enterprise
150 Limited liability cooperation (LLC)
151 State-owned LLC
159 Other LLC
160 Stock limited company
170 Privately owned enterprises
171 Sole proprietorship
172 Partnership
173 Private limited liability corporations
174 Private company limited by shares
190 Other domestic enterprise
200 Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT) investment enterprise
210 Jointly owned enterprise
220 Jointly operated enterprise
230 HMT solely owned enterprise
240 HMT investment LLC
300 Foreign investment enterprise
310 Jointly owned enterprise
320 Jointly operated enterprise
330 Foreign owned enterprise
340 Foreign investment LLC
– This table shows the registration types of Chinese firms that are obtained from the National
Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China.
The state or collectively owned domestic firms category includes the following registration types:
110, 120, 141, 142, 143 and 151. The privately owned domestic firms category includes all types
under 170 (from 171 to 174). The mixed domestic firms category includes all other registration
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types falling under domestic enterprises (100). The FDI firms category includes all registration
types falling under Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT) investment enterprise (200) and foreign
investment enterprise (300).
If a firm’s registration type changed from one category to another, its main ownership must
have changed due to mergers and acquisitions. Firms are classified as domestic acquired if their
registration type changed within the first three categories, while firms are classified as foreign
acquired if their registration type changed from one of the three domestic categories into the
category of FDI firms. As mentioned in the paper, this method fails to capture acquisitions within
a category.
A.5 Simple OLS Regressions
This section describes the simple OLS regressions whose results are reported in the beginning of
section 4 as the first pass of our difference-in-differences empirical exercises.
We use the following equation for our simple OLS regressions:
yi = α+ βWi + γXi + εi, (A.0.9)
where yi is firm i’s change of performance following the acquisition, Wi is a dummy variable
indicating foreign acquisitions (vs. domestic acquisitions) and Xi includes variables that are used
to control for pre-acquisition differences among firms. In particular, Xi are independent variables
in our logit model (see section 3.1 for a description of these variables) and a dummy variable
for provinces of firm location. We consider six regressions and use changes in three measures of
productivity, the leverage ratio, the liquidity ratio and export share as our dependent variable
respectively in each of these six regressions. Regression results are reported in the following tables.
To save space, we only report the results for one of the three measures of productivity (TFP). In
each table, the row of Treated is for the estimation results of β in equation (A.0.9). K/L is real
capital per worker, and other variables should be self-explanatory.
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Table A.3: OLS Regression Results for Productivity
Acquisition year One year after Two years after
Coeff. Std. Err P > |z| Coeff. Std. Err P > |z| Coeff. Std. Err P > |z|
Treated 0·021 0·017 0·231 −0·009 0·021 0·673 0·043∗ 0·026 0·098
Employment 0·025∗∗∗ 0·005 0·000 0·017∗ 0·009 0·050 0·020∗∗ 0·010 0·039
Real wage −0·141∗∗∗ 0·011 0·000 −0·160∗∗∗ 0·013 0·000 −0·174∗∗∗ 0·017 0·000
Age −0·002∗∗∗ 0·000 0·000 −0·001∗∗ 0·001 0·017 −0·002∗∗ 0·001 0·033
K/L 0·032∗∗∗ 0·006 0·000 0·034∗∗∗ 0·008 0·000 0·036∗∗∗ 0·009 0·000
Export −0·023∗∗ 0·011 0·034 −0·012 0·017 0·499 −0·010 0·022 0·663
Leverage −0·095∗∗∗ 0·027 0·001 −0·162∗∗∗ 0·039 0·000 −0·204∗∗∗ 0·051 0·000
Liquidity −0·079∗∗∗ 0·027 0·003 −0·168∗∗∗ 0·038 0·000 −0·274∗∗∗ 0·044 0·000
State-owned −0·016 0·011 0·137 −0·039∗∗∗ 0·014 0·007 −0·060∗∗∗ 0·018 0·001
– The dependent variable is the change in productivity (as measured by firm-level TFP) following acquisitions.
– Treated is for the estimate of β in equation (A.0.9).
– K/L is the real capital per worker, Export is the export status, Leverage is the leverage ratio, Liquidity is
the liquidity ratio and State-owned is a dummy for state/collectively owned enterprises. See Section 3 for a
description of these variables.
– Other independent variables that are not reported in the table include industry, year and location dummies.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Table A.4: OLS Regression Results for the Leverage Ratio
Acquisition year One year after Two years after
Coeff. Std. Err P > |z| Coeff. Std. Err P > |z| Coeff. Std. Err P > |z|
Treated −0·019∗∗∗ 0·003 0·000 −0·021∗∗∗ 0·005 0·000 −0·015∗∗ 0·006 0·019
Employment 0·006∗∗∗ 0·001 0·000 0·010∗∗∗ 0·001 0·000 0·010∗∗∗ 0·002 0·000
Real wage 0·001 0·002 0·529 −0·002 0·003 0·335 0·000 0·003 0·992
Age 0·000∗∗∗ 0·000 0·000 0·000∗∗∗ 0·000 0·006 0·000∗∗ 0·000 0·038
K/L −0·002 0·001 0·130 −0·002 0·002 0·329 −0·003 0·002 0·125
Export 0·001 0·003 0·639 0·001 0·004 0·794 0·005 0·005 0·290
Leverage −0·309∗∗∗ 0·009 0·000 −0·406∗∗∗ 0·010 0·000 −0·492∗∗∗ 0·013 0·000
Liquidity −0·008 0·006 0·157 −0·012 0·008 0·137 −0·036∗∗∗ 0·012 0·003
State-owned −0·009∗∗∗ 0·003 0·000 −0·005 0·004 0·182 −0·004 0·005 0·409
– The dependent variable is the change in the leverage ratio following acquisitions.
– Treated is for the estimate of β in equation (A.0.9).
– K/L is the real capital per worker, Export is the export status, Leverage is the leverage ratio, Liquidity is
the liquidity ratio and State-owned is a dummy for state/collectively owned enterprises. See Section 3 for a
description of these variables.
– Other independent variables that are not reported in the table include industry, year and location dummies.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table A.5: OLS Regression Results for the Liquidity Ratio
Acquisition year One year after Two years after
Coeff. Std. Err P > |z| Coeff. Std. Err P > |z| Coeff. Std. Err P > |z|
Treated 0·029∗∗∗ 0·005 0·000 0·036∗∗∗ 0·007 0·000 0·036∗∗∗ 0·009 0·000
Employment −0·013∗∗∗ 0·001 0·000 −0·018∗∗∗ 0·002 0·000 −0·019∗∗∗ 0·002 0·000
Real wage 0·016∗∗∗ 0·002 0·000 0·019∗∗∗ 0·003 0·000 0·019∗∗∗ 0·004 0·000
Age −0·001∗∗∗ 0·000 0·000 0·000∗∗∗ 0·000 0·006 0·000 0·000 0·337
K/L −0·013∗∗∗ 0·001 0·000 −0·011∗∗∗ 0·002 0·000 −0·012∗∗∗ 0·003 0·000
Export −0·001 0·004 0·720 −0·006 0·005 0·241 −0·003 0·007 0·608
Leverage −0·094∗∗∗ 0·009 0·000 −0·113∗∗∗ 0·012 0·000 −0·108∗∗∗ 0·015 0·000
Liquidity −0·412∗∗∗ 0·010 0·000 −0·492∗∗∗ 0·013 0·000 −0·548∗∗∗ 0·017 0·000
State-owned 0·008∗∗∗ 0·003 0·004 0·003 0·004 0·533 −0·001 0·006 0·919
– The dependent variable is the change in the liquidity ratio following acquisitions.
– Treated is for the estimate of β in equation (A.0.9).
– K/L is the real capital per worker, Export is the export status, Leverage is the leverage ratio, Liquidity is
the liquidity ratio and State-owned is a dummy for state/collectively owned enterprises. See Section 3 for a
description of these variables.
– Other independent variables that are not reported in the table include industry, year and location dummies.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Table A.6: OLS Regression Results for the Export Share
Acquisition year One year after Two years after
Coeff. Std. Err P > |z| Coeff. Std. Err P > |z| Coeff. Std. Err P > |z|
Treated 0·027∗∗∗ 0·005 0·000 0·032∗∗∗ 0·005 0·000 0·028∗∗∗ 0·008 0·000
Employment 0·007∗∗∗ 0·001 0·000 0·009∗∗∗ 0·001 0·000 0·014∗∗∗ 0·002 0·000
Real wage 0·006∗∗∗ 0·002 0·000 0·008∗∗∗ 0·002 0·000 0·007∗∗ 0·003 0·012
Age 0·000 0·000 0·845 0·000 0·000 0·924 0·000 0·000 0·118
K/L 0·001 0·001 0·382 0·000 0·001 0·946 0·002 0·002 0·157
Export −0·087∗∗∗ 0·006 0·000 −0·098∗∗∗ 0·007 0·000 −0·116∗∗∗ 0·010 0·000
Leverage 0·004 0·005 0·426 −0·006 0·007 0·376 −0·001 0·010 0·958
Liquidity −0·001 0·004 0·811 −0·004 0·007 0·579 0·008 0·010 0·414
state-owned −0·001 0·002 0·604 0·000 0·003 0·925 0·001 0·004 0·731
– The dependent variable is the change in export share following acquisitions.
– Treated is for the estimate of β in equation (A.0.9).
– K/L is the real capital per worker, Export is the export status, Leverage is the leverage ratio, Liquidity is
the liquidity ratio and State-owned is a dummy for state/collectively owned enterprises. See Section 3 for a
description of these variables.
– Other independent variables that are not reported in the table include industry, year and location dummies.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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A.6 Domestic-acquired Firms vs. Non-acquisition Domestic Firms
In Table A.7, we compare the performance of domestic-acquired firms relative to domestic firms
with no change in ownership. There is no evidence that the financial conditions of domestic-acquired
firms improved or deteriorated after the acquisition relative to non-acquisition firms: none of the
coefficient estimates is statistically significant in all six cases for the leverage ratio and the liquidity
ratio. Note that the magnitude of the coefficient estimates in this case is also much smaller than
that in our benchmark model in Table 6, suggesting that our benchmark results are mainly driven
by an improvement of financial conditions of foreign-acquired firms. In Section 4.4, we provide
further evidence by showing that our findings are also robust to including only ex-ante private
firms.
Table A.8 presents the results of other performances for domestic-acquired firms relative to non-
acquisition firms. Again, we confirm that the documented performance improvement of foreign-
acquired firms is not driven by a performance deterioration of domestic-acquired firms.4
4The domestic acquisitions increased target firms’ output, employment, real profit and real capital per worker
relative to non-acquisition domestic firms, but reduced the real wage. The decrease of the real wage for domestic-
acquired firms in Table A.8 is smaller in absolute value than the increase of the real wage for foreign-acquired firms
relative to domestic-acquired firms in Table 7, indicating a net positive gain in the real wage for foreign-acquired
firms.
55
Table A.7: Results for Domestic-acquired Firms
Productivity (measured by TFP)
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·097∗∗∗ 0·012 8·320 0·000 0·074 0·120
One year after 0·137∗∗∗ 0·016 8·430 0·000 0·105 0·168
Two years after 0·103∗∗∗ 0·021 4·910 0·000 0·062 0·144
Leverage ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year −0·001 0·003 −0·220 0·822 −0·005 0·004
One year after −0·002 0·003 −0·530 0·597 −0·008 0·005
Two years after 0·000 0·005 0·090 0·928 −0·008 0·009
Liquidity ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year −0·003 0·004 −0·690 0·489 −0·010 0·005
One year after −0·008 0·005 −1·570 0·117 −0·018 0·002
Two years after 0·002 0·006 0·320 0·746 −0·010 0·014
Export share
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·003 0·002 1·420 0·157 −0·001 0·007
One year after 0·002 0·003 0·790 0·430 −0·003 0·007
Two years after −0·001 0·003 −0·440 0·663 −0·008 0·005
– This table reports the results for domestic-acquired firms.
– The treatment group includes domestic-acquired firms and the control group includes
non-acquisition firms that are paired with domestic-acquired firms using the propensity
score matching method.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table A.8: Other Performance of Domestic-acquired Firms
Gross output
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·091∗∗∗ 0·009 10·020 0·000 0·073 0·109
One year after 0·135∗∗∗ 0·014 9·610 0·000 0·108 0·163
Two years after 0·143∗∗∗ 0·018 7·930 0·000 0·108 0·178
Employment
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·045∗∗∗ 0·007 6·170 0·000 0·030 0·059
One year after 0·078∗∗∗ 0·010 7·570 0·000 0·058 0·098
Two years after 0·101∗∗∗ 0·013 7·920 0·000 0·076 0·127
Real wage
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year −0·016∗ 0·009 −1·720 0·085 −0·034 0·002
One year after −0·029∗∗ 0·012 −2·410 0·016 −0·052 −0·005
Two years after −0·016 0·015 −1·090 0·275 −0·045 0·013
Real profit
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·127∗∗∗ 0·023 5·410 0·000 0·081 0·173
One year after 0·194∗∗∗ 0·035 5·590 0·000 0·126 0·263
Two years after 0·296∗∗∗ 0·044 6·760 0·000 0·210 0·382
Real Capital per worker
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·005 0·012 0·430 0·668 −0·018 0·028
One year after 0·037∗∗ 0·016 2·410 0·016 0·007 0·068
Two years after 0·103∗∗∗ 0·019 5·400 0·000 0·065 0·140
– This table reports the performance of domestic-acquired firms relative to non-
acquisition domestic firms. All measures of firm performance are in logarithms.
– The treatment group includes domestic-acquired firms and the control group includes
non-acquisition domestic firms that are paired with domestic-acquired firms using the
propensity score matching method.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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A.7 Domestic Acquisitions of SOEs vs Surviving SOEs
Table A.9: Results for Domestic Acquisitions of SOEs
Productivity (measured by TFP)
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·148∗∗∗ 0·020 7·520 0·000 0·110 0·187
One year after 0·163∗∗∗ 0·025 6·490 0·000 0·114 0·212
Two years after 0·153∗∗∗ 0·032 4·820 0·000 0·091 0·216
Leverage ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year −0·002 0·004 −0·460 0·647 −0·009 0·006
One year after 0·001 0·005 0·160 0·874 −0·009 0·011
Two years after −0·002 0·006 −0·290 0·772 −0·014 0·011
Liquidity ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·003 0·006 0·590 0·553 −0·008 0·015
One year after 0·007 0·008 0·820 0·412 −0·009 0·022
Two years after 0·007 0·009 0·770 0·442 −0·011 0·025
Export share
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·001 0·002 0·280 0·778 −0·004 0·005
One year after 0·002 0·003 0·710 0·480 −0·004 0·008
Two years after 0·002 0·004 0·510 0·607 −0·006 0·011
– This table reports the results for domestic-acquired SOE firms.
– The treatment group includes domestic-acquired SOE firms and the control group
includes SOE firms that experienced no change in registration type and are paired with
domestic-acquired firms using the propensity score matching method.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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A.8 Robustness Checks
Match on Location
Table A.10: Results for Matching on Location with Propensity Score Matching
Productivity (measured by TFP)
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·024 0·028 0·860 0·389 −0·031 0·079
One year after 0·016 0·031 0·510 0·607 −0·045 0·077
Two years after 0·061 0·043 1·410 0·159 −0·024 0·145
Leverage ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year −0·026∗∗∗ 0·007 −3·800 0·000 −0·039 −0·012
One year after −0·019∗∗ 0·008 −2·480 0·013 −0·035 −0·004
Two years after −0·005 0·010 −0·440 0·658 −0·025 0·016
Liquidity ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·034∗∗∗ 0·009 3·820 0·000 0·016 0·051
One year after 0·048∗∗∗ 0·010 4·840 0·000 0·029 0·068
Two years after 0·031∗∗∗ 0·011 2·720 0·007 0·009 0·053
Export share
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·025∗∗∗ 0·008 3·150 0·002 0·010 0·041
One year after 0·036∗∗∗ 0·009 3·950 0·000 0·018 0·054
Two years after 0·026∗∗ 0·011 2·290 0·022 0·004 0·049
– This table reports the results when location (province) is added to the benchmark
model as a matching variable in the propensity score matching.
– The treatment group includes foreign-acquired firms and the control group includes
domestic-acquired firms that are paired with foreign-acquired firms using the propensity
score matching method.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table A.11: Results for Nonparametric Exact Matching on Location
Productivity (measured by TFP)
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·048∗∗ 0·024 2·020 0·043 0·002 0·095
One year after 0·024 0·029 0·830 0·405 −0·033 0·081
Two years after 0·047 0·033 1·400 0·160 −0·018 0·112
Leverage ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year −0·017∗∗∗ 0·006 −2·840 0·005 −0·029 −0·005
One year after −0·023∗∗∗ 0·007 −3·220 0·001 −0·038 −0·009
Two years after −0·012 0·009 −1·360 0·173 −0·029 0·005
Liquidity ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·022∗∗∗ 0·007 2·960 0·003 0·007 0·037
One year after 0·028∗∗∗ 0·010 2·860 0·004 0·009 0·047
Two years after 0·029∗∗ 0·011 2·560 0·011 0·007 0·052
Export share
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·029∗∗∗ 0·008 3·490 0·000 0·013 0·045
One year after 0·024∗∗∗ 0·009 2·670 0·008 0·006 0·042
Two years after 0·018 0·012 1·550 0·121 −0·005 0·041
– This table reports the results when we use nonparametric matching with exact match
on location following the method in Abadie and Imbens (2006 and 2008).
– The treatment group includes foreign-acquired firms and the control group includes
domestic-acquired firms that are paired with foreign-acquired firms.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Different Definitions for Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions
In this section, we check the robustness of our benchmark results under different definitions of
domestic and foreign acquisitions.
Table A.12 reports the results for considering all registration type changes as acquisitions. As in
our benchmark model, there is no significant evidence that foreign acquisitions can increase the
productivity of target firms relative to domestic acquisitions, while they significantly improved
target firms’ financial conditions and export performance. The results are also quantitatively
similar to our benchmark results: following the acquisition, the leverage ratio declined about 2
percentage points, the liquidity ratio rose 4 percentage points and the export share increased 3
percentage points.
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Table A.13 reports the results for a different definition of domestic acquisitions. In this case, the
domestic acquisitions include firms that changed registration types across different domestic
groups as defined in the benchmark model plus two additional cases. In the first cast, we consider
all registration type changes in the group of mixed domestic firms (registration codes of 130, 149,
159, 160 and 190) as domestic acquisitions. This group covers firms with heterogeneous
backgrounds and registration type changes within the group are likely to be mergers and
acquisitions. There are about 200 observations annually for these registration type changes. In
the second case, we consider as domestic acquisitions the registration type changes in which state-
or collectively-owned enterprises changed to state-owned LLC (registration code 151). There are
about 30 observations in each year for this case. Then we repeat our benchmark
difference-in-differences exercise and find that our benchmark results hold up qualitatively well.
Table A.14 presents the results for using changes in foreign capital shares to identify foreign
acquisitions and Table A.15 reports results for wholly foreign-owned firms. The results are
qualitatively similar to our benchmark results.
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Table A.12: Results for All Registration Type Changes
Productivity (as measured by TFP)
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·028 0·024 1·170 0·244 −0·019 0·076
One year after 0·030 0·032 0·910 0·361 −0·034 0·093
Two years after 0·025 0·034 0·740 0·462 −0·042 0·092
Leverage ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year −0·021∗∗∗ 0·006 −3·200 0·001 −0·033 −0·008
One year after −0·019∗∗∗ 0·007 −2·690 0·007 −0·033 −0·005
Two years after −0·014∗ 0·009 −1·680 0·093 −0·031 0·002
Liquidity ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·025∗∗∗ 0·008 3·300 0·001 0·010 0·041
One year after 0·042∗∗∗ 0·009 4·760 0·000 0·025 0·059
Two years after 0·040∗∗∗ 0·012 3·490 0·000 0·018 0·063
Export share
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·029∗∗∗ 0·008 3·690 0·000 0·013 0·044
One year after 0·034∗∗∗ 0·009 3·990 0·000 0·017 0·051
Two years after 0·037∗∗∗ 0·011 3·480 0·000 0·016 0·059
– This table reports the results when all changes in registration type are considered as
acquisitions.
– The treatment group includes foreign-acquired firms and the control group includes
domestic-acquired firms that are paired with foreign-acquired firms using the propensity
score matching method.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table A.13: Results for a Definition of Domestic Acquisitions
Productivity (as measured by TFP)
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·055∗∗ 0·024 2·260 0·024 0·007 0·103
One year after 0·042 0·031 1·360 0·174 −0·018 0·102
Two years after 0·048 0·036 1·370 0·172 −0·021 0·118
Leverage ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year −0·024∗∗∗ 0·006 −3·770 0·000 −0·036 −0·011
One year after −0·021∗∗∗ 0·008 −2·770 0·006 −0·036 −0·006
Two years after −0·012 0·009 −1·310 0·190 −0·031 0·006
Liquidity ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·035∗∗∗ 0·008 4·470 0·000 0·020 0·051
One year after 0·030∗∗∗ 0·010 3·030 0·002 0·010 0·049
Two years after 0·030∗∗∗ 0·011 2·760 0·006 0·009 0·051
Export share
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·022∗∗∗ 0·008 2·640 0·008 0·006 0·039
One year after 0·034∗∗∗ 0·009 3·830 0·000 0·017 0·052
Two years after 0·038∗∗∗ 0·011 3·480 0·001 0·017 0·060
– This table reports the results when we consider a different definition for domestic
acquisitions.
– The treatment group includes foreign-acquired firms and the control group includes
domestic-acquired firms that are paired with foreign-acquired firms using the propensity
score matching method.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table A.14: Results for Using Capital Share to Identify Foreign Acquisitions
Productivity (as measured by TFP)
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year −0·002 0·019 −0·100 0·917 −0·039 0·035
One year after 0·006 0·025 0·220 0·823 −0·044 0·055
Two years after 0·042 0·032 1·320 0·188 −0·020 0·104
Leverage ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year −0·016∗∗∗ 0·004 −3·820 0·000 −0·025 −0·008
One year after −0·012∗∗ 0·006 −2·220 0·027 −0·023 −0·001
Two years after −0·002 0·007 −0·370 0·709 −0·016 0·011
Liquidity ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·030∗∗∗ 0·006 5·290 0·000 0·019 0·042
One year after 0·027∗∗∗ 0·007 3·820 0·000 0·013 0·040
Two years after 0·044∗∗∗ 0·009 4·700 0·000 0·026 0·062
Export share
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·039∗∗∗ 0·006 6·700 0·000 0·027 0·050
One year after 0·043∗∗∗ 0·007 5·800 0·000 0·028 0·057
Two years after 0·044∗∗∗ 0·009 4·700 0·000 0·026 0·062
– This table reports the results for using capital share to identify foreign acquisitions, in
which firms’ shares of foreign capital increased from below 10% before the acquisition to
above 10% after the acquisition.
– Our results are robust if 25% is used as cutoff in identifying foreign acquisitions. China
requires a minimum of 25% of foreign capital for a firm to registered as a joint venture
or foreign firm.
– The results are also robust when firm productivity is measured by gross output per
worker and value-added output per worker.
– The treatment group includes foreign-acquired firms and the control group includes
domestic-acquired firms that are paired with foreign-acquired firms.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table A.15: Results for Wholly Foreign-owned FDI
Productivity (as measured by TFP)
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year −0·006 0·045 −0·130 0·899 −0·094 0·082
One year after −0·015 0·052 −0·300 0·765 −0·116 0·086
Two years after 0·078 0·059 1·320 0·188 −0·038 0·194
Leverage ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year −0·041∗∗∗ 0·011 −3·670 0·000 −0·064 −0·019
One year after −0·023∗ 0·012 −1·890 0·059 −0·048 0·001
Two years after −0·044∗∗∗ 0·015 −2·900 0·004 −0·073 −0·014
Liquidity ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·046∗∗∗ 0·015 3·130 0·002 0·017 0·074
One year after 0·045∗∗ 0·018 2·540 0·011 0·010 0·079
Two years after 0·070∗∗∗ 0·020 3·430 0·001 0·030 0·110
Export share
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition year 0·033∗∗ 0·017 1·970 0·048 0·000 0·065
One year after 0·043∗∗ 0·017 2·560 0·011 0·010 0·076
Two years after 0·026 0·019 1·370 0·170 −0·011 0·063
– This table reports the results for wholly foreign-owned FDI firms.
– The treatment group includes foreign-acquired firms and the control group includes
domestic-acquired firms that are paired with foreign-acquired firms using the propensity
score matching method.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Different Labor Intensities
Table A.16: Results for Different Labor Intensities
Productivity (as measured by TFP)
High labor intensity Medium labor intensity Low labor intensity
Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z|
Acquisition year 0·066 0·049 0·179 0·029 0·047 0·542 −0·014 0·042 0·744
One year after 0·015 0·056 0·787 0·051 0·053 0·343 −0·095∗ 0·056 0·089
Two years after 0·025 0·064 0·701 0·038 0·063 0·546 −0·104∗ 0·063 0·099
Leverage ratio
High labor intensity Medium labor intensity Low labor intensity
Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z|
Acquisition year −0·014 0·010 0·142 −0·018 0·011 0·542 −0·029∗∗∗ 0·011 0·009
One year after −0·032∗∗ 0·013 0·014 −0·001 0·013 0·343 −0·023∗ 0·014 0·097
Two years after 0·005 0·015 0·742 −0·022 0·015 0·546 −0·030∗ 0·018 0·097
Liquidity ratio
High labor intensity Medium labor intensity Low labor intensity
Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z|
Acquisition year 0·022∗ 0·012 0·065 0·016 0·014 0·265 0·039∗∗∗ 0·015 0·007
One year after 0·068∗∗∗ 0·017 0·000 0·043∗∗ 0·017 0·013 0·026 0·019 0·166
Two years after 0·045∗∗ 0·019 0·021 0·024 0·014 0·095 0·062∗∗∗ 0·021 0·004
Export share
High labor intensity Medium labor intensity Low labor intensity
Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z|
Acquisition year 0·031∗∗ 0·015 0·036 0·008 0·013 0·548 0·037∗∗∗ 0·011 0·001
One year after 0·045∗∗ 0·018 0·011 0·034∗∗ 0·013 0·010 0·023∗∗ 0·011 0·043
Two years after 0·051∗∗ 0·022 0·022 0·016 0·016 0·332 0·030∗∗ 0·014 0·040
– Industries (2-digit level) are divided into three groups according to their labor intensity.
– The treatment group includes foreign-acquired firms and the control group includes domestic-acquired firms that are paired
with foreign-acquired firms using the propensity score matching method.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Exporters and Non-exporters
Table A.17: Results for Exporters and Non-exporters
Productivity (as measured by TFP)
Exporters Non-exporters
Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z|
Acquisition year 0·026 0·041 0·525 0·016 0·039 0·682
One year after −0·065 0·064 0·308 −0·059 0·049 0·227
Two years after 0·039 0·070 0·575 0·063 0·055 0·251
Leverage ratio
Exporters Non-exporters
Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z|
Acquisition year −0·037∗∗∗ 0·012 0·002 −0·019∗∗ 0·009 0·037
One year after −0·037∗∗∗ 0·013 0·004 −0·015 0·012 0·205
Two years after −0·037∗∗∗ 0·013 0·004 −0·037∗∗ 0·016 0·018
Liquidity ratio
Exporters Non-exporters
Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z|
Acquisition year 0·060∗∗∗ 0·012 0·000 0·028∗∗ 0·012 0·019
One year after 0·048∗∗∗ 0·017 0·006 0·049∗∗∗ 0·015 0·001
Two years after 0·075∗∗∗ 0·022 0·001 0·024 0·018 0·172
Export share
Exporters Non-exporters
Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z|
Acquisition year 0·000 0·017 0·989 0·045∗∗∗ 0·009 0·000
One year after 0·011 0·019 0·581 0·043∗∗∗ 0·008 0·000
Two years after 0·008 0·025 0·749 0·057∗∗∗ 0·009 0·000
Export
Exporters Non-exporters
Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z|
Acquisition Year 0·342∗ 0·197 0·082 0·955∗∗∗ 0·132 0·000
One year after 0·537∗∗ 0·225 0·017 0·690∗∗∗ 0·168 0·000
Two years after 0·591∗∗ 0·274 0·031 0·913∗∗∗ 0·192 0·000
– If a firm exported in one or more years before acquisition, it is classified as an exporter.
Otherwise, the firm is classified as a non-exporter.
– The treatment group includes foreign-acquired firms and the control group includes
domestic-acquired firms that are paired with foreign-acquired firms using the propensity
score matching method.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Processing Trade
Table A.18 presents our results of processing trade. As in the benchmark model, we do not find
evidence of productivity improvement for either processing-trade foreign acquisitions or other
foreign acquisitions. There exists strong evidence that foreign acquisitions improved target firms’
financial conditions based on the liquidity ratio. The liquidity ratio increased significantly at the
1% level for the foreign-acquired firms regardless of their processing-trade status. The results for
the leverage ratio remain strong for the group of other foreign acquisitions, while they are weak
for foreign acquisitions involving processing trade. For both groups of foreign-acquired firms, the
export share significantly increased relative to domestic acquired firms following the acquisition.
The export share increases are statistically significant at the 1% level in all three years for the
foreign-acquired firms that pursue processing trade. For other foreign-acquired firms, the
increases in the export share are quantitatively smaller but remain statistically significant at the
10% or higher levels.
Among foreign-acquired firms, the share of exporters that participate in processing trade fell from
27.7% in the acquisition year to 24.3% two years after the acquisition. This result and our finding
that foreign acquisitions improve target firms’ financial conditions are consistent with Manova
and Yu (2011)’s finding that financial constraints affect Chinese exporters’ choice of trade regime.
They document that Chinese firms with more liquid assets and less leverage pursue more ordinary
trade rather than processing trade. Furthermore, financial constraints also influence trade
strategies of processing-trade firms. There are two sub-categories in China’s processing trade:
import-and-assembly and pure assembly. The materials of pure assembly are directly provided by
foreign clients, while import-and-assembly firms have to pay up-front costs to import intermediate
inputs and hence require more working capital. Manova and Yu (2011) find that financially
healthier enterprises are more likely to pursue import-and-assembly, which are also more
profitable than pure assembly.5 Consistent with their results, we find that fewer foreign-acquired
firms are involved in pure assembly as their financial conditions improved after the acquisition.
5Manova and Yu (2011) use companies’ shares of processing exports in total exports and shares of pure assembly
in processing trade, rather than the share of firms. We are not able to follow their measures because we do not have
access to the trade volume data from the Chinese Customs Office.
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Two years after the acquisition, 10% of the foreign-acquired firms participated solely in pure
assembly comparing to 13.3% in the acquisition year.
Table A.18: Results for Processing-trade Foreign Acquisitions
Productivity (as measured by TFP)
Processing-trade Foreign Acquisitions Other Foreign Acquisitions
Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z|
Acquisition Year −0·006 0·459 0·989 0·034 0·662 0·959
One year after −0·019 0·438 0·966 0·001 0·746 0·999
Two years after 0·056 0·408 0·891 −0·017 0·748 0·981
Leverage ratio
Processing-trade Foreign Acquisitions Other Foreign Acquisitions
Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z|
Acquisition Year −0·030∗∗∗ 0·010 0·002 −0·025∗∗∗ 0·005 0·000
One year after 0·007∗∗ 0·004 0·040 −0·013∗∗∗ 0·005 0·008
Two years after 0·003 0·005 0·582 −0·016∗∗∗ 0·006 0·006
Liquidity ratio
Processing-trade Foreign Acquisitions Other Foreign Acquisitions
Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z|
Acquisition Year 0·030∗∗∗ 0·007 0·000 0·029∗∗∗ 0·008 0·000
One year after 0·058∗∗∗ 0·009 0·000 0·039∗∗∗ 0·008 0·000
Two years after 0·053∗∗∗ 0·008 0·000 0·034∗∗∗ 0·009 0·000
Export share
Processing-trade Foreign Acquisitions Other Foreign Acquisitions
Coefficient Std. Err P > |z| Coefficient Std. Err P > |z|
Acquisition Year 0·043∗∗∗ 0·013 0·000 0·016∗∗ 0·007 0·025
One year after 0·059∗∗∗ 0·009 0·000 0·024∗∗∗ 0·006 0·000
Two years after 0·026∗∗∗ 0·008 0·000 0·013∗ 0·007 0·055
– Processing-trade foreign acquisitions include firms that are classified as processing-trade firms
following the acquisitions.
– In processing trade, firms export all final products after they import all or part of intermediate
inputs.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Different Matching Methods
Table A.19: Results for Non-parametric Nearest Neighbor Matching
Productivity (as measured by TFP)
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·053∗∗ 0·022 2·380 0·017 0·009 0·097
One year after 0·034 0·029 1·170 0·243 −0·023 0·091
Two years after 0·039 0·032 1·210 0·226 −0·024 0·103
Leverage ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year −0·020∗∗∗ 0·006 −3·220 0·001 −0·032 −0·008
One year after −0·020∗∗∗ 0·008 −2·710 0·007 −0·035 −0·006
Two years after −0·007 0·009 −0·770 0·439 −0·025 0·011
Liquidity ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·025∗∗∗ 0·007 3·500 0·000 0·011 0·040
One year after 0·026∗∗∗ 0·009 2·800 0·005 0·008 0·045
Two years after 0·023∗∗ 0·011 2·210 0·027 0·003 0·044
Export share
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·035∗∗∗ 0·008 4·180 0·000 0·019 0·052
One year after 0·030∗∗∗ 0·009 3·310 0·001 0·012 0·047
Two years after 0·022∗∗ 0·010 2·170 0·030 0·002 0·042
– This table reports the results for the non-parametric nearest neighbor matching with
the exact match for acquisition year and industry.
– The treatment group includes foreign-acquired firms and the control group includes
domestic-acquired firms that are paired with foreign-acquired firms using the non-
parametric nearest neighbor matching in Abadie and Imbens (2006 and 2008).
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table A.20: Results for Propensity-score Re-weighting Matching
Productivity (as measured by TFP)
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·039 0·195 0·200 0·842 −0·344 0·422
One year after 0·013 0·217 0·060 0·954 −0·413 0·438
Two years after 0·040 0·223 0·180 0·857 −0·397 0·477
Leverage ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year −0·019∗∗∗ 0·004 −5·000 0·000 −0·027 −0·012
One year after −0·019∗∗∗ 0·004 −4·290 0·000 −0·028 −0·010
Two years after −0·015∗ 0·008 −1·770 0·077 −0·032 0·002
Liquidity ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·028∗∗∗ 0·005 5·410 0·000 0·018 0·038
One year after 0·039∗∗∗ 0·007 5·710 0·000 0·026 0·052
Two years after 0·039∗∗∗ 0·008 4·700 0·000 0·023 0·055
Export share
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·026∗∗∗ 0·007 3·840 0·000 0·013 0·039
One year after 0·032∗∗∗ 0·009 3·610 0·000 0·015 0·050
Two years after 0·031∗∗∗ 0·006 5·040 0·000 0·019 0·043
– This table reports the results for the nearest neighbor propensity-score re-weighting
matching method.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Partial Year Effects
Bernard et al. (2014) show that annual data may suffer from the partial year effects. Two
identical firms that enter the same market in different months (e.g., one in January and another
in December) will report dramatically different statistics in the first calendar year. This issue
exists for our acquisitions if one acquisition took place in January and another in December in the
same year. In this case, the pre-acquisition-year characteristics that we use to match foreign and
domestic acquisitions may not be good description of these firms’ pre-acquisition conditions. This
problem can be alleviated by using pre-acquisition characteristics two years before the acquisition
as regressors in our logit model of the propensity score matching. We thank an anonymous referee
for suggesting we conduct this robustness check. Table A.21 represents the results for this exercise
and our benchmark findings hold up well in this case.
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Table A.21: Results after Controlling for the Partial Year Effects
Productivity (as measured by TFP)
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·076∗∗ 0·037 2·060 0·039 0·004 0·149
One year after 0·019 0·049 0·380 0·701 −0·077 0·114
Two years after 0·069 0·052 1·330 0·185 −0·033 0·171
Leverage ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year −0·020∗∗ 0·009 −2·160 0·031 −0·039 −0·002
One year after −0·020∗ 0·011 −1·820 0·068 −0·042 0·002
Two years after −0·022 0·014 −1·600 0·110 −0·049 0·005
Liquidity ratio
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·032∗∗ 0·014 2·400 0·017 0·006 0·059
One year after 0·049∗∗∗ 0·016 2·990 0·003 0·017 0·081
Two years after 0·066∗∗∗ 0·017 3·950 0·000 0·034 0·099
Export share
Coefficient Std. Err z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Acquisition Year 0·045∗∗ 0·013 3·600 0·000 0·021 0·070
One year after 0·037∗∗ 0·012 3·160 0·002 0·014 0·060
Two years after 0·028∗∗∗ 0·014 2·050 0·040 0·001 0·055
– This table reports the results for the robustness check that uses pre-acquisition char-
acteristics two years before the acquisition in the logit model of the propensity score
matching.
– ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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